Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc.

381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004)

Facts

P sued D, alleging violations of the patent and copyright laws. P claims that D is violating the DMCA, specifically the anti-trafficking provision of § 1201(a)(2). The technology at issue involves Garage Door Openers (GDOs). A GDO consists of a hand-held portable transmitter and a garage door opening device mounted in a homeowner's garage. If a user activates the transmitter, it sends a radio frequency (RF) signal to the receiver located on the opening device. Once the opener receives a recognized signal, the signal processing software directs the motor to open or close the garage door. When a homeowner purchases a GDO system, the manufacturer provides both an opener and a transmitter. Those who desire a replacement or spare transmitters can purchase them in the aftermarket. Aftermarket consumers can purchase 'universal transmitters' that they can program to interoperate with their GDO system regardless of make or model. P and D are the only significant distributors of universal GDO transmitters. P places no explicit restrictions on the types of transmitters that the homeowner may use with its system at the time of purchase. P's customers assume that they enjoy all of the rights associated with the use of their GDOs and any software embedded therein that the copyright laws and other laws of commerce provide. At issue is P's Security+ line of GDOs and D's Model 39 universal transmitter. P incorporates a copyrighted 'rolling code' computer program that constantly changes the transmitter signal needed to open the garage door. D's Model 39 transmitter, which does not incorporate rolling code, nevertheless allows users to operate Security+ openers. P claims that D's transmitter renders the Security+ insecure by allowing unauthorized users to circumvent the security inherent in rolling codes. P also contends that because of this property Model 39, D is in violation of the anti-trafficking clause of the DMCA's anticircumvention provisions, specifically § 1201(a)(2). D designed Model 39 to interoperate with common GDOs, including both rolling code and non-rolling code GDOs. D uses a simple algorithm of transmissions to circumvent P’s security measures. P has not alleged either that D infringed its copyright or that D is liable for contributory copyright infringement. P has alleged is that because its opener and transmitter both incorporate computer programs 'protected by copyright' and because rolling codes are a 'technological measure' that 'controls access' to those programs, D liable for violating § 1201(a)(2). Section 1201(a) states: Circumvention of copyright protection systems  (a) Violations regarding circumvention of technological measures. (1) (A) No person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title. . . .(2) No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that-- (A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title; (B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title; or  (C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with that person's knowledge for use in circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title. (3) As used in this subsection-- (A) to 'circumvent a technological measure' means to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise, to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without the authority of the copyright owner; and (B) a technological measure 'effectively controls access to a work' if the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the application of information, or a process or a treatment,  with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work. The District Court denied P's motion for summary judgment. P contends that D 'primarily designed the Model 39 for the purpose of circumventing P's technological measure that effectively controls access to P's copyrighted computer programs,' contravening § 1201(a)(2)(A). A homeowner who purchases a Chamberlain GDO owns it and has a right to use it to access his or her own garage. P does not place any explicit terms or conditions on use to limit the ways that a purchaser may use its products. The District Court concluded that because P never restricted its customers' use of competing transmitters those customers had implicit authorization to use Model 39. Thus. P could not possibly meet its burden of proving that D trafficked in a device designed to circumvent a technological measure to gain unauthorized access to P's copyrighted computer programs. The court granted D's motion for summary judgment on P's DMCA claim. P appealed. P argues that  'D violates the prima facie requirement of anti-trafficking § 1201(a)(2).' P argues that the District Court erred in assigning P the burden of proving that access was unauthorized rather than placing the burden on D to prove that the access was authorized. D urges us not to place the burden of proving authorization on defendants, arguing that it would be tantamount to reading a new 'authority' requirement into the DMCA.