Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. Et Al.

826 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1987)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

After discovery, D filed its first motion for summary judgment, and claimed that P had failed to show that the decedent came into contact with any product containing asbestos designed, manufactured, or distributed by D. P filed an opposition which directed the court's attention to three items: (1) a transcript of Mr. Catrett's testimony in a workmen's compensation claim, in which he indicated his exposure to a product called 'Firebar' while working for a company called Anning-Johnson in the Chicago, Illinois area; (2) a letter from the Assistant Secretary of Anning-Johnson, T.R. Hoff, to a Mr. O'Keefe of Aetna Casualty & Surety, Anning-Johnson's insurance company, reporting on Mr. Catrett's employment with Anning-Johnson ; and (3) a letter from Aetna's Mr. O'Keefe to Mrs. Catrett's counsel essentially restating the contents of the Hoff letter. D.E. 87. D then withdrew its motion for summary judgment. D then filed a motion for a change of venue. D then renewed its motion for summary judgment. D contended that P had failed to show exposure 'within the jurisdictional limits' of the District Court, a rather different point than that advanced in its geographically unlimited initial motion. P again directed the court's attention to the three evidentiary items upon which she had originally relied: (1) the workmen's compensation testimony of Mr. Catrett; (2) the Hoff letter; and (3) the O'Keefe letter. P then filed Supplemental Answers to D's Interrogatories. P listed 'T.R. Hoff, Assistant Secretary, Anning-Johnson Company' as a person 'having knowledge of facts relevant to the subject matter in this lawsuit.' She further indicated that Mr. Hoff would be called as a witness at trial. The District Court granted D's motion for summary judgment on the spot, ruling from the bench that there had been 'no showing that P was exposed to the D's product in the District of Columbia or elsewhere within the statutory period.' On appeal, a divided panel reversed. It reasoned that D offered no supporting evidence, and therefore failed to file a properly supported motion for summary judgment as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e). The Supreme Court reversed. 477 U.S. 317 (1986). The Court instructed that while 'a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, that support its motion, such an identification is sufficient properly to support a summary judgment motion. Having thus concluded that Celotex had met its initial burden of production and filed a proper summary judgment, motion, the Court reversed and remanded the case, suggesting that 'superior knowledge of local law' made us 'better suited' to address questions we had previously found unnecessary to consider, namely the adequacy of the showing made by P in opposition to D's motion for summary judgment, or . . . whether such a showing, if reduced to admissible evidence, would be sufficient to carry P's burden of proof at trial. The precise question on remand is whether the record before the District Court at the moment of truth evidenced a genuine issue of material fact.