Cathedral Of The Incarnation In The Diocese Of Long Island Inc. v. Garden City Company

697 N.Y.S.2d 56 (App.Div. 1999)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

By a deed dated November 20, 1891, the heirs of Cornelia sold to the Cathedral of the Incarnation (P) two parcels of land for $43,247.50. Pursuant to the restrictive covenants in the deed, the premises were conveyed to P and its successors forever for the use of the Protestant Episcopal Church but without any power, right, or authority to grant, convey, or mortgage the property. The deed also contained a restriction that the premises were not to be used for any other purposes than as sites or grounds for buildings or institutions connected with P and devoted to its religious uses or educational purposes. In 1893, the heirs conveyed to the predecessor of the Garden City Company (D), certain other property inclusive of all the right, title, property, and interest of the heirs or any of them to any reversion or remainder in all or any of the lands conveyed to P. P continued to own and operate the premises in accordance with the restrictions contained therein from the time of the conveyance in 1891 until the commencement of this suit. In 1993, P was forced to file bankruptcy under Chapter 11. The court directed certain properties be sold. P then commenced this statutory action to modify or extinguish the restrictions. In its answer, D asserted that it was successor to all the rights, title, interest and claims that belong to the heirs and that the deed from the heirs conveyed less than a full fee title so that D had the right to assert ownership if Cathedral ended usage for religious purposes. D argued that the deed created either a condition subsequent or a conditional limitation and that the statute that allowed for the extinguishment of D’s interests was unconstitutional. P moved for summary judgment. The court found that P was entitled to that judgment. The court found that the right of reentry arose from P’s deed and that D as an assignee could not enforce it since when the deeds were made, the right of reacquisition or re-entry was not assignable, devisable, or descendible. The trial court then noted that the case fell within the statutory law and that to require P to hold the land in perpetuity was unconscionable. The court also held that D failed to establish any entitlement to damages. D appealed.