This section contains the nature of the case and procedural background.

Reynolds (D) was employed by the accounting firm of Stevens, Fluhr, Chismar, Alvino & Schechter, CPA, (the firm (D)). Reynolds (D) was a non-professional, part-time employee who conducted detail work for auditors. She was responsible for the verification, checking, and preparation of bank reconciliations. She worked in the firm's office and also visited clients. Reynolds(D) was required to use her own vehicle for travel, with business mileage reimbursed by the firm. Reynolds (D) could claim mileage from the office to the client assignment and from the client assignment back to the office, and in the event that she was traveling from home, it would be the mileage from her home to the client or from the office to the client, whichever was closer, and that would also hold true for the return trip. If she were traveling from the client back home, she would get the shorter distance of the mileage from the client to home or the client to the office. On the days Reynolds (D) traveled from her home to the client, she would begin billing when she arrived at the client's destination. On the days that she went directly home after meeting with a client, she would stop billing when she left the client, not when she actually arrived at home. If she had to return to the office after meeting with a client, she would bill for her travel time to the firm. On the day of the accident, Reynolds (D) spent the morning at the firm and then traveled to a client location. She was reimbursed for the mileage from the client to the office, and she was not paid wages for her travel time. At approximately 4:29 p.m., when Reynolds was traveling from the client to her home, the accident occurred. On November 3, 1997, P filed an automobile negligence action against Reynolds (D) and eventually amended the complaint, adding the firm (D) as a defendant, alleging that Reynolds (D) was an employee, servant, and/or agent of the firm (D) when the accident occurred because she was in the scope of her employment. The firm (D) filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the firm's (D) motion. On a motion for reconsideration based on new precedent, the trial court determined that Reynolds (D) was acting within the scope of her employment and granted Ps' motion for partial summary judgment with respect to respondeat superior liability. The Appellate Division affirmed. The firm (D) then moved for leave to appeal.

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