D was charged with sexual abuse of a minor. The prosecution called the victim who was five-and-a-half -years-old at the time of the trial to the stand to testify. D objected on grounds of competency. A voir dire examination was conducted. The testimony demonstrated that the child knew where her mother worked and where her father worked, and she knew the name of the Commonwealth's Attorney. She demonstrated her ability to knowingly telling a lie and advised that when she tells a lie or is bad, or uses bad words, her mother and father whip her. She said that she lived in Winchester, Kentucky, with her mother and father. She counted to ten for D's counsel and related her favorite TV programs, one of which is Bugs Bunny, who she thought was a real person who brings her candy at Eastertime. She also expressed displeasure with counsel for D; referred to him as a 'nut'; and stated that if he didn't stop asking such silly questions she would kill him and he would be an angel after all his blood ran out. She avowed, to tell the truth. The court ruled she was competent. D was convicted and appealed. The declaratory judgment action involved the question of whether Piper was a resident of the home of his grandparents in Berryville, Virginia, at the time of his death. If he was, there would be coverage under a D personal liability umbrella policy issued to Mr. Piper's grandfather, Paul Massanopoli. D asserted that William Piper lived with his parents, Julie and David Piper, in Harpers Ferry, West Virginia, on the date of his death. Prinz (P) entered evidence that Piper was a Virginia resident. D sought to introduce evidence that William Piper resided in Harpers Ferry, West Virginia.
Any testimony regarding where Piper lived and his motivations or intent in signing these legal documents to the effect that he lived with his grandfather would necessarily involve testimony regarding personal transactions with the deceased. Such testimony by interested parties such as William Lee Piper's family members would relate to the course of conduct offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted and would, therefore, be barred by the Dead Man's statute. P got the verdict, and D appealed. D contends that the Court erred in (1) applying the Dead Man's Statute, W. Va. Code §57-3-1 (1937), and prohibiting the jury from considering testimony from the decedent's family members regarding where the decedent was residing on the date of his death