Byrne v. Avery Center For Obstetrics And Gynecology, P.C.

102 A.3d 32 (2014)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

Congress enacted the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. § 1320d et seq., to protect the privacy of patients' health information given emerging advances in information technology. Avery (D) provided P [with] gynecological and obstetrical care and treatment. D provided its patients with notice of its privacy policy regarding protected health information and agreed, based on this policy and law, that it would not disclose Ps health information without her authorization. P was in a personal relationship with Andro Mendoza. In October 2004, she instructed D not to release her medical records to Mendoza. In March 2005, P moved from Connecticut to Vermont where she presently lives. Mendoza filed paternity actions against P in Connecticut and Vermont. D was served with a subpoena requesting its presence together with P's medical records at the Probate Court on July 12, 2005. D did not alert P of the subpoena, file a motion to quash it, or appear in court. D mailed a copy of P's medical file to the court around July 12, 2005. Mendoza informed P that he reviewed the medical file. On September 15, 2005, P filed a motion to seal her medical file, which was granted. P alleges that she suffered harassment and extortion threats from Mendoza since he viewed her medical records. P sued D alleging in part negligence for its failure to safeguard her medical records. The trial court agreed with D's contention that 'HIPAA preempts 'any action dealing with confidentiality/privacy of medical information,'' which prompted the court to treat its summary judgment motion as one seeking dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that HIPAA does not create a private right of action, requiring claims of violations instead to be raised through the department's administrative channels. The court rejected P's claim that she had not utilized HIPAA as the basis of her cause of action, but rather, relied on it as ''evidence of the appropriate standard of care' for claims brought under state law, namely, negligence.' It ruled the claims are HIPAA claims.' The trial court also held that P's statutory negligence claims founded on a violation of § 52-146o were similarly preempted because the state statute had been superseded by HIPAA. The trial court concluded that the same analysis applied to P's common-law negligence claims and they were preempted. The trial court dismissed P's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. P appealed and the Supreme Court of Connecticut eventually heard the appeal.