Butler v. Mckellar

494 U.S. 407 (1990)

Facts

Pamela was last seen alive when she left work riding a moped. The next day Lane's body was found near a bridge, and the following day Lane's moped was found submerged in a pond behind a church. P was arrested six weeks later on an assault and battery charge. P invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Counsel appeared with him at a bond hearing. P was unable to make bond, however, and was returned to the county jail. P's attorney contended in state collateral relief proceedings that after the bond hearing, he had told the police officers not to question P further. The officers testified that they remembered no such instruction. P was taken from the jail to the Police station and informed for the first time that he was a suspect in Lane's murder. After receiving Miranda warnings, P indicated that he understood his rights and signed two 'waiver of rights' forms. The police then interrogated P about the murder. P did not request his attorney's presence at any time during the interrogation. P claimed another killed Lane and then sought P's help in disposing of the moped. P then changed the story to he had come upon Lane in his car and had motioned her over to the side of the road. She then voluntarily accompanied him to a nearby wooded area where the two engaged in consensual sex. Afterward, Lane threatened to accuse P of rape when she realized she would be late getting home. P claimed that he panicked, shot Lane with a handgun, and dumped her body off a bridge. P claimed that the guy he accused of killing her helped him dump the moped. P was charged with first-degree murder. The state refused to suppress the confession. P was found guilty and sentenced to death. P eventually filed this petition for federal habeas relief. The court dismissed the petition. At the court of appeals, P argued Edwards v. Arizona and the court rejected it. It held that the statements were preceded by appropriate warnings and a voluntary waiver of Fifth Amendment protections. A properly initiated interrogation on an entirely different charge does not intrude into an accused's previously invoked rights but instead offers the accused an opportunity to weigh his rights intelligently in light of changed circumstances. The Supreme court decided Roberson where the Fifth Amendment bars police-initiated interrogation following a suspect's request for counsel in the context of a separate investigation. The Fourth Circuit panel considered P's new contention and held that P was not entitled to the retroactive benefit of Roberson. The interrogation of P, while unquestionably contrary to present 'guidelines,' was conducted in strict accordance with established law at the time. P appealed.