Burns v. Town Of Palm Beach

999 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2021)

Facts

For the last eighteen years, P has been living in his 10,063 square foot mansion-which he describes as a 'traditional home'-on the Atlantic Ocean in D. P wants to knock down his beachfront mansion and build a new one that will reflect his evolved philosophy of simplicity in lifestyle and living with an emphasis on fewer personal possessions. P's existing mansion was 10,063 square feet to be replaced with a 25,198 square foot mansion. The new two-story mansion will have a basement garage, outdoor pool and spa, cabana, and exercise room. D's architectural review commission had to approve the plans. D created its architectural review commission because the town is 'internationally known . . . for beauty, quality and value' and 'beautiful communities can be created only through a deliberate search for beauty on the part of the community leadership, architects, planners, realtors, and the building industry.' The commission was tasked with reviewing building permit applications to make sure new structures were in harmony with the proposed developments on land in the general area and not excessively dissimilar in relation to any other structure existing . . . within 200 feet of the proposed site. There are seven commissioners on the architectural review commission. All must be 'specially qualified' by 'training or experience in art, architecture, community planning, land development, real estate, landscape architecture, or other relevant business or profession, or by reason of civic interest and sound judgment to judge the effects of a proposed building upon the desirability, property values and development of surrounding areas.' No less than two, but no more than three, commissioners must be Florida-registered architects. And one commissioner must be a landscape architect or a 'master gardener.' Section 18-205(a) of the city code identifies ten criteria for the commission to consider. P's landscape architect testified that the 'most important design criterion,' was 'to screen the house properly by curtaining the house from the public road with heavy landscaping, including a sixteen-to-eighteen-foot-tall hedge and a large specimen of trees. The design also called for landscaping to buffer the new mansion from P's northern and southern neighbors. After some of P's neighbors opposed the plan, the town council deferred action until the architectural review commission considered the building permit. At the commission's May 25, 2016 meeting, Burns presented the testimony of his landscaper, attorney, architects, and expert architectural witness. P submitted a report and testified about the architectural styles in Palm Beach and previous applications that the commission had approved. The report identified fifteen midcentury modern design applications, other than P's, that the commission considered from 1979 to 2016. Chase documented the commission's deliberations on each application and some of the individual commissioners' statements about the designs. He compared the commissioners' observations to the eight design features in section 18-205(a)(6) and categorized the commission's reception as good, bad, or no comment for each criterion. He also identified where a commissioner found a design feature 'excessively dissimilar' in relation to nearby structures. The commission had approved fourteen applications and denied one. P’s expert gave his professional opinion that P's design met the commission's criteria in section 18-205(a)(6). P's neighbors told the commission that the new mansion was too large for the lot, too dissimilar to the neighborhood, had inappropriate glass-to-mass ratios, and invaded their privacy. The commission deferred its decision on the building permit. P presented another revised plan. P added a limestone wall between the front of the mansion and Ocean Boulevard (the residential street in front of the home) with a louvered gate. The commission voted five-to-two to deny his application. The commission explained why it denied the building permit based on section 18-205(a) criteria: (4) The proposed building or structure is not in harmony with the proposed developments on land in the general area, with the comprehensive plan for the town, and with any precise plans adopted pursuant to the Comprehensive Plan. (6) The proposed building or structure is excessively dissimilar in relation to any other structure . . . within 200 feet of the proposed site in respect to . . . (c) Architectural compatibility. (d) Arrangement of the components of the structure. (e) Appearance of mass from the street or from any perspective visible to the public or adjoining property owners. (f) Diversity of design that is complimentary with size and massing of adjacent properties. (8) The proposed development is not in conformity with the standards of this Code and other applicable ordinances insofar as the location and appearance of the buildings and structures are involved. P sued D in federal court. P brought a Fourteenth Amendment due process void-for-vagueness challenge and an equal protection challenge to section 18-146 (the section explaining the town's findings and purpose for creating the architectural review commission) and section 18-205(a) (the section with the commission's criteria for approving building permits) of D's ordinances. Burns also alleged that the two ordinances violated his First Amendment right to speak through the midcentury modern design of his new mansion. P claimed that the ordinances violated his constitutional rights both on their face and as applied to him. D's summary judgment motion was referred to the magistrate judge. The magistrate judge recommended granting D's summary judgment motion. Relating to the First Amendment claim, the magistrate judge adopted the three-part predominant-purpose test from Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, for determining whether the new mansion was constitutionally protected speech. The predominant-purpose test asks whether: (1) the owner of the structure subjectively intended to communicate a message; (2) the predominant purpose of the structure was to communicate a message; and (3) a reasonable observer viewing the structure in its surrounding context had a great likelihood of understanding it to be predominantly communicating some message. The magistrate judge found that the predominant purpose of the mansion was nonexpressive because the design-with its two stories, basement garage, numerous bedrooms and bathrooms, pool, oceanfront views, privacy wall, and heavy landscaping-demonstrated that the 'structure [was] to serve as a residence, not as a piece of visual art.' And any message from the mansion would be ambiguous, according to the magistrate judge, because of its residential features and because, even though the mansion was a custom design, a reasonable viewer would not infer that the design sent a message. Rather, a viewer might think that the owner liked the architecture, wanted a different style from his neighbors, or believed the house would be more hurricane resistant. Because the design was nonexpressive, the magistrate judge found that the First Amendment did not apply. The magistrate judge held that the commission's criteria were not vague because the ordinance listed specific design elements to compare a proposed structure to others in the area and identified 'architectural compatibility' and 'harmony' with nearby structures as guidelines for a design. As to the equal protection claim, the magistrate judge said that P had failed to present evidence of similarly situated building permit applications that D treated differently than his, so his class-of-one claim failed. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report. P appealed. P contends that the district court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment prematurely, erred in applying the predominant-purpose test to his First Amendment free speech claim (which led it to reach the wrong result), and erred in denying his vagueness and equal protection claims.