Burgess v. Superior Court

2 Cal. 4th 1064 (1992)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

P underwent a C section when she was under a general anesthetic. As she left the recovery room, she was told that something was wrong with her baby. The baby suffered permanent brain and nervous system damage as a result of oxygen deprivation. P suffered emotional harm. Gupta (D) moved for a summary judgment arguing that P did not meet the standard in Thing v. LaChusa. The trial court granted the motion, and the appeals court reversed because P was a direct victim of D's negligence rather than a bystander. P entered labor. She was admitted to the hospital under the care of D, her obstetrician, who had also participated in her prenatal care. D artificially ruptured P's membranes. Shortly thereafter, according to P, D yelled to the nurse: 'Emergency, prolapsed cord.' At that point, P 'knew that something was wrong' with the delivery. Preparations were begun for a cesarean section. Twenty-one minutes elapsed between the time D diagnosed the cord prolapse and the time P was taken to emergency surgery. She was told as she was wheeled out of the recovery room that 'something' was wrong with her baby boy. Joseph was deprived of sufficient oxygen through his umbilical cord for approximately 44 minutes before his delivery. He suffered permanent brain and nervous system damage, allegedly as a result of the deprivation of oxygen. P sued D and the hospital. In this suit, Joseph died during the course of the litigation, allegedly as the result of his injuries. P sought emotional distress damages. Ds moved for summary adjudication in that P did not contemporaneously observe Joseph's injury as required by this court in Thing v. La Chusa. The trial court granted the motion. P petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate vacating the trial court's order. The appellate court granted the writ in a brief decision in which it held that Thing, supra, 48 Cal.3d 644, was not controlling under the facts presented by this case, because Burgess was a 'direct victim' rather than a 'bystander.' This appeal resulted.