Brown v. Miller

2 So.3d 321 (2008)

Facts

Thomas W. Miller, Jr. (D) was the trustee and lifetime beneficiary of a trust established by his wife. Upon Elinor's death in 1999, her trust assets were distributed to designated charities and family members with the balance being divided into three separate sub-trusts, designated as Trust A-1, Trust A-2, and Trust B, with each serving a distinct purpose. This appeal relates solely to the Trust A-2 assets. The trust states in part: The Trustee shall also pay to my husband (D) such additional amounts of principal from Trust 'A-2' as he may from time to time request. . . .3. Upon the death of my husband, THOMAS W. MILLER, JR., the Trustee shall pay over and distribute the then remaining balance of Trust 'A-2', if any, to such person or persons, and in such manner, as he shall appoint by his last Will and Testament, which makes reference to said power of appointment, including in him the power to appoint to his estate. Any portion of Trust 'A-2' not effectively appointed by my husband, THOMAS W. MILLER, JR., shall continue to be held in trust for the lifetime of my son, THOMAS W. MILLER, III.  On February 11, 2000, D executed a third codicil to his last will and testament. D purported to exercise his power of appointment by directing that, upon his death, the Trust A-2 balance be distributed to The Elinor and T. W. Miller, Jr. Foundation ('the Foundation'). Between the date of his wife's death and January 25, 2002, D as trustee, transferred approximately $ 420,000 from Trust A-2 to himself and others. On January 25, 2002, D as trustee, then transferred the remaining balance of the Trust A-2 assets (approximately seven million dollars) to the Bill Miller Trust. D died in April 2004. His son, Tom (P), then brought the underlying action against his estate, the personal representatives of his estate, the trustees of the Bill Miller Trust, and the Foundation (collectively referred to as 'Appellants') to set aside the seven-million-dollar transfer to the Bill Miller Trust and to invalidate D's purported exercise of his power of appointment. In granting P's motion for partial summary judgment, the trial court found that the transfer at issue was improper for three reasons: (1) it was contrary to the trust language limiting transfers to Elinor's husband; (2) it was contrary to the trust language limiting transfers from 'time to time;' and (3) it violated Ds duty to act in good faith to protect the interests of the Trust A-2 contingent remaindermen. D appealed.