Brown v. Lober

75 Ill.2d 547, 389 N.E. 2d 1188 (1979)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

On May 8, 1974, Ps granted a coal option to the Consolidated Coal Company (Consolidated) for the coal rights on the 80-acre tract for the sum of $6,000. Two years later, Ps 'discovered' that they owned only a one-third interest in the subsurface coal rights. In 1947, a prior grantor had reserved a two-thirds interest in the mineral rights on the property. Until May 4, 1976, they believed that they were the sole owners of the surface and subsurface rights on the 80-acre tract. Consolidated renegotiated their agreement to provide for payment of $2,000 in exchange for a one-third interest. On May 25, 1976, Ps filed this action against the executor of the estate of Faith Bost, seeking damages in the amount of $4,000. The deed was a general statutory form warranty deed meeting the requirements of section 9 of 'An Act concerning conveyances.' Such a deed was deemed to hold a conveyance in fee simple, to the grantee, his heirs or assigns, with covenants on the part of the grantor, that at the time of the making and delivery of such deed he was lawfully seized of an indefeasible estate in fee simple, in and to the premises therein described, and had good right and full power to convey the same. The law held that certain covenants of title are implied in every statutory form warranty deed. They were the covenant of seisin and the covenant of good right to convey. These covenants, which are considered synonymous. These assure the grantee that the grantor is, at the time of the conveyance, lawfully seized and has the power to convey an estate of the quality and quantity which he professes to convey. Subsection 2 of the Act represents the covenant against incumbrances and Subsection 3 sets forth the covenant of quiet enjoyment, which is synonymous with the covenant of warranty. Under quiet enjoyment 'the grantor warrants to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, the possession of the premises and that he will defend the title granted by the terms of the deed against persons who may lawfully claim the same, and that such covenant shall be obligatory upon the grantor, his heirs, personal representatives and assigns.' The Bosts covenanted that they were the owners in fee simple. Ps alleged a cause of action for breach of the covenant of seisin. The covenant of seisin is a covenant in praesenti and, therefore, if broken at all, is broken at the time of delivery of the deed. The deed was delivered on December 21, 1957, and that cause of action accrued on that date. The trial court held that this cause of action was barred by the 10-year statute of limitations. Ps also eventually alleged breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. Ps also eventually alleged breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. The court denied that cause of action. The appeals court held that the quiet enjoyment action was not barred by the statute of limitations and that the breach of seisin had not accrued until Ps discovered the truth. D appealed.