Brock v. Yale Mortgage Corporation

700 S.E.2d 583 (Ga. 2010)

Facts

P and his wife were having marital difficulties. The Brocks purchased the property jointly in 1987, financing the transaction with a loan from First Railroad Mortgage Company. In connection with the loan, the Brocks executed a security deed and promissory note in the amount of $56,000 in the lender's favor. The Brocks did not have a joint bank account. P maintained a checking account and gave his wife money each month to make the loan payment, but she did not always use the funds for that purpose. As a result, the Brocks' loan went into default in October 1996. Joyce (W) allowed the game to continue by borrowing money from a friend bringing the note current. In August 2000, W received a second notice of foreclosure sale. W did not tell P about the notice. To forestall foreclosure, she worked out a payment plan with Atlantic. In January 2001, W received a third notice of foreclosure sale after defaulting under the payment plan. W did not inform P but procured a loan from Yale (D). At the February 2001 loan closing, W presented an executed, unrecorded quitclaim deed by which P purportedly transferred his interest in the property to her. Yale does not dispute that P's signature on the quitclaim deed is forged. Yale loaned Joyce $60,000, of which $15,460 was used to satisfy the Brocks' debt to the first mortgage company. W received $38,085.44 in cash at closing. W executed a promissory note and deed to secure debt in Yale's (D) favor. In May 2004, P discovered that his wife had spent over $200,000 from his checking account without his knowledge. He filed for divorce shortly thereafter. P then learned about the 2001 foreclosure proceedings, the forged quitclaim deed, and the Yale (D) loan. In August 2004, the Brocks executed a settlement agreement in their divorce proceedings in which W transferred 'any and all of her rights, title and interest [in the property], whether legal or equitable' to P. The settlement agreement was incorporated into the final judgment and decree in the divorce proceedings.  In January 2005, P commenced this action. The trial court granted D's summary judgment motion, declaring that D holds a one-half undivided interest in the property. D filed an emergency motion for clarification and/or reconsideration, the trial court amended its order to add that D also 'holds the other one-half undivided interest in the property.' P appealed.