Brecht v. Abrahamson

Facts

Brecht (D) was serving time in a Georgia prison for felony theft when his sister and her husband, Molly and Roger Hartman, paid the restitution for D's crime and assumed temporary custody of him. The Hartmans brought D home with them to Alma, Wisconsin, where he was to reside with them before entering a halfway house. This caused some tension in the Hartman household because Roger Hartman, a local district attorney, disapproved of D's heavy drinking habits and homosexual orientation, not to mention his previous criminal exploits. To make the best of the situation, though, the Hartmans told D that he was not to drink alcohol or engage in homosexual activities in their home. Just one week after his arrival, however, D violated this house rule. D broke into their liquor cabinet and began drinking. He then found a rifle in an upstairs room and began shooting cans in the backyard. When Roger Hartman returned home from work, D shot him in the back and sped off in Mrs. Hartman's car. After fleeing the scene and when D was apprehended, D replied that 'it was a big mistake' and asked to talk with 'somebody that would understand [him].'D was returned to Wisconsin and thereafter was given his Miranda warnings at an arraignment. D was charged with first-degree murder. At trial in the Circuit Court for Buffalo County, he took the stand and admitted shooting Hartman, but claimed it was an accident. According to petitioner, when he saw Hartman pulling into the driveway on the evening of the shooting, he ran to replace the gun in the upstairs room where he had found it. But as he was running toward the stairs in the downstairs hallway, he tripped, causing the rifle to discharge the fatal shot. After the shooting, Hartman disappeared, so D drove off in Mrs. Hartman's car to find him. Upon spotting Hartman at his neighbor's door, however, D panicked and drove away. The evidence contradicting this story was substantial. But the State also pointed out that D had failed to mention anything about the shooting's being an accident to the officer who found him in the ditch, the man who gave him a ride to Winona, or the officers who eventually arrested him. Over the objections of defense counsel, the State also asked D during cross-examination whether he had told anyone at any time before trial that the shooting was an accident, to which petitioner replied 'no,' and made several references to petitioner's pretrial silence during closing argument. D was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals set the conviction aside on the ground that the State's references to petitioner's post-Miranda silence violated due process under Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), and that this error was sufficiently 'prejudicial' to require reversal. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. Although it agreed that the State's use of petitioner's post-Miranda silence was impermissible, the court determined that this error '`was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' D then sought a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, reasserting his Doyle claim. The District Court agreed that the State's use of petitioner's post-Miranda silence violated Doyle but disagreed with the Wisconsin Supreme Court that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and set aside the conviction. The District Court based its harmless error determination on its view that the State's evidence of guilt was not 'overwhelming,' and that the State's references to petitioner's post-Miranda silence, though 'not extensive,' were 'crucial' because petitioner's defense turned on his credibility. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. It, too, concluded that the State's references to petitioner's post-Miranda silence violated Doyle, but it disagreed with both the standard that the District Court had applied in conducting its harmless-error inquiry and the result it reached. It held that the Chapman harmless error standard does not apply in reviewing Doyle error on federal habeas. It held that the standard for determining whether petitioner was entitled to habeas relief was whether the Doyle violation '`had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict,'' (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S., at 776 ). Applying this standard, the Court of Appeals concluded that petitioner was not entitled to relief because, 'given the many more, and entirely proper, references to [petitioner's] silence preceding arraignment,' he could not contend with a 'straight face' that the State's use of his post-Miranda silence had a 'substantial and injurious effect' on the jury's verdict.

Issues

Rule of Law

Holding and Decision

Legal Analysis

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