Bozman v. Bozman

830 A.2d 450 (2003)

Facts

H initiated divorce proceedings against W on grounds of adultery. The parties were divorced on March 12, 2001. Shortly before the divorce was finalized, H filed a complaint sounding in malicious prosecution against W/ H alleged that, as a result of criminal charges, which W brought against him on February 17, 2000, May 3, 2000, and July 19, 2000, he was arrested and charged with stalking, harassment and multiple counts of violation of a Protective Order. H further alleged that the charges were brought without probable cause, were deliberately fabricated to ensure that H would be arrested, and were in retaliation for H's initiation of the divorce proceedings and his unwillingness to make concessions in those proceedings. W moved to dismiss the complaint. She argued, in support of that motion, inter alia, that the action was barred based upon the common law doctrine of interspousal tort immunity. The Circuit Court granted W's Motion to Dismiss, but with leave to amend. H then filed an Amended Complaint and W filed a motion to dismiss, relying, also as she had done before, on the doctrine of interspousal immunity. On the same day that a hearing on the motion to dismiss was held, H filed a Second Amended Complaint. That complaint reiterated the allegations of the earlier complaint as Count I and added a second malicious prosecution count. That second malicious prosecution count alleged that, on February 2, 2001, W filed, against H, additional charges of violating an ex parte order, which although ultimately dismissed, again resulted in H's incarceration and incurring an expense to be released. H claimed that the W fabricated the charges, although, on this occasion, the momentum was different; it was in response to the initial malicious prosecution action and W's inability to 'prevail in her position' in the divorce proceedings. Because these alleged acts occurred after the parties were divorced, H argued that that count was not subject to the interspousal immunity defense. The court again ruled that the action was barred by the doctrine of interspousal immunity. H appealed. The intermediate appellate court held that 'malicious prosecution is not so outrageous as to bring it within the narrow exception to the doctrine of interspousal immunity.' The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Count I of the Second Amended Complaint. Turning to Count II, the intermediate appellate court vacated the trial court's dismissal of that count and remanded the case for further proceedings. W 'failed to demonstrate that the parties were married when the cause of action in Count II arose.' Both parties appealed.