Bousley v. United States

523 U.S. 614 (1998)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

D was charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). A superseding indictment added the charge that he 'knowingly and intentionally used . . . firearms during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime,' in violation of 18 U. S. C. §924(c). D agreed to plead guilty to both charges while reserving the right to challenge the quantity of drugs used in calculating his sentence. The District Court accepted Ds pleas, finding that he was 'competent to enter [the] pleas, that [they were] voluntarily entered, and that there [was] a factual basis for them.' D was sentenced to 78 months' imprisonment on the drug count, a consecutive term of 60 months' imprisonment on the §924(c) count, and four years of supervised release. D appealed but did not challenge the validity of his plea. The Court of Appeals affirmed. In June 1994, D sought a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the factual basis for his guilty plea on the ground that neither the 'evidence' nor the 'plea allocution' showed a 'connection between the firearms in the bedroom of the house, and the garage, where the drug trafficking occurred.' The petition was dismissed. D appealed. While his appeal was pending, we held in Bailey that a conviction for use of a firearm under §924(c)(1) requires the Government to show 'active employment of the firearm.' Active employment includes uses such as 'brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, and, most obviously, firing or attempting to fire' the weapon, but does not include mere possession of a firearm. Thus, a 'defendant cannot be charged under §924(c)(1) merely for storing a weapon near drugs or drug proceeds,' or for 'placement of a firearm to provide a sense of security or to embolden.' D argued that Bailey should be applied 'retroactively,' that petitioner's guilty plea was involuntary because he was misinformed about the elements of a §924(c)(1) offense, that this claim was not waived by his guilty plea, and that his conviction should, therefore, be vacated. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's order of dismissal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.