Black v. Village Of Park Forest

20 F.Supp.2d 1218 (1998)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

In January 1994, D authorized inspections by an administrative official of rental properties at 'all reasonable times.' Prior to January 1994, D inspected rental properties only after tenants moved out and before new tenants moved in. D conducts routine annual inspections of the interior of rented, non-owner-occupied single-family homes. D does not conduct such inspections of occupied condominiums, duplexes, units in multi-family apartment complexes, or owner-occupied homes, but conducts exterior inspections and interior common area inspections of these types of properties. Inspections of these types of properties also occur during licensing and re-occupancy permitting and upon tenant complaint. D requires that the owner of a rented, single-family home provide access on demand to all parts and areas of the property for the inspection. An inspection fee of $100 per inspection. is charged. If the owner or the tenant objects D must obtain either an administrative search warrant or a court order. Search warrants issued under § 16-3(c) are served on the occupants of the house by an administrative official and a police officer. If the occupant is not at home, a notice is posted on the door of the house to inform the occupant of the existence of the search warrant. D charges an additional $60 fee if a landlord or a tenant requires D to obtain a search warrant. Ps are individuals who currently rent single-family homes and object to the searches. Almost all the warrants obtained for these searches were based simply that an administrative inspection had not occurred within the past year. Ps challenged the constitutionality of D's policy under the Fourth Amendment. Ps argued that the inspection program was unconstitutional because it was not based on reasonable legislative or administrative standards and that it impermissibly burdened the exercise of the Fourth Amendment right to demand a search warrant by charging a fee when the village was unable to obtain consent and was forced to obtain a search warrant. D claimed the entire regime was a reasonable exercise of administrative authority. Both parties moved for summary judgment.