Bilida v. Mccleod

211 F.3d 166 (2000)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

P rescued an orphaned raccoon thereafter named 'Mia.' P and her family raised the raccoon as a pet and kept her in a cage attached to the back of the family's home. On August 8, 1995, a Warwick officer Brierly entered P's backyard in response to a security alarm signal. Brierly saw Mia in her cage. Uncertain whether possession of the raccoon was legal, he called Legault, the city's animal control officer, and then left the premises. A half hour or so later, Legault and Brierly returned to find P at home. Legault asked P for her permit from the Department, which is required under Rhode Island law for possession of raccoons and certain other animal species. P did not have a permit. The Department of Environmental Management sent two of its officers (Jeffrey Belmonte and Sheila DiSarro) to P's home where the officers--who had no warrant--entered P's gated backyard and seized Mia after a struggle with P. DiSarro then issued P a summons for illegally possessing a raccoon but (according to P) the officers promised her that Mia would not be killed. Susan Littlefield, the state's public health veterinarian. Littlefield, after learning that Mia had been hand fed by P, told Greene that according to the state's rabies protocol, Mia had to be euthanized and tested for rabies. The protocol, which was adopted in response to a supposed epidemic of raccoon rabies moving up the east coast in the early 1990s, calls for animals in certain high risk 'target species' to be tested for rabies (which requires killing the animal) under specified circumstances. Mia was then shot, tested, and found to have no rabies infection. P was prosecuted in state court for the misdemeanor offense of possessing the raccoon without a permit. The state court judge found that the officers had acted in good faith but also concluded that they had violated the Fourth Amendment because no exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry and seizure of the already caged animal. The state abandoned the prosecution of P. P sued Ds under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of her constitutional rights of 'privacy,' due process, and protection against unreasonable search and seizure. The district court granted Ds' motion for summary judgment, holding that no federal right of privacy was violated; that the warrantless search and seizure were justified by the 'plain view' exception to the warrant requirement; and that P had no property interest in Mia to trigger a right to due process pertaining to Mia's treatment. The district court dismissed the state claims without prejudice. P appealed.