Banks v. Dretke

540 U.S. 668 (2004)

Facts

Whitehead had been shot three times. Whitehead had been in the company of D. A confidential informant reported that 'D was coming to Dallas to meet an individual and get a weapon.' Police stopped D's vehicle en route from Dallas, found a handgun in the car, and arrested the car's occupants. Returning to the Dallas residence D had visited, interviewed Cook and recovered a second gun, a weapon Cook said D had left with him several days earlier. The second gun was the Whitehead murder weapon. D sought information that might reveal the identity of the informant, and the trial court sustained P's objection that it was confidential. D was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Prior to trial, D's attorney was told by P there would be no need to litigate discovery issues P would provide D with all discovery to which you are entitled. P then withheld evidence that would have allowed D to discredit two essential prosecution witnesses. Farr was a key witness, and on cross-examination, D asked Farr whether he had 'ever taken any money from some police officers,' or 'given any police officers a statement.' Farr answered no to both questions; he asserted emphatically that police officers had not promised him anything and that he had 'talked to no one about this [case]' until a few days before trial. These answers were untrue, but the State did not correct them. Farr was the paid informant who told police that D would travel to Dallas in search of a gun. P failed to that Farr was a paid police informant. P raised no red flag when the informant testified, untruthfully, that he never gave the police any statement and, indeed, had not talked to any police officer about the case until a few days before the trial. Instead of correcting the informant's false statements, P told the jury that the witness 'had been open and honest with you in every way,' and that his testimony was of the 'utmost significance.' On cross-examination, Cook three times represented that he had not talked to anyone about his testimony. Cook had at least one 'pretrial practice session' in which he was intensively coached. D was convicted of murder committed in the course of a robbery. P offered Farr's testimony again in the penalty phase. Farr claimed that the gun was needed as Farr and D were going to pull some robberies. On cross-examination, defense counsel twice asked whether Farr had told police of the Dallas trip. The State remained silent as Farr twice perjuriously testified: 'No, I did not.' Ibid. D's counsel also inquired whether Farr had previously attempted to obtain prescription drugs by fraud, and, 'up tight over that,' would 'testify to anything anybody want[ed] to hear.' Farr first responded: 'Can you prove it' Instructed by the court to answer defense counsel's questions, Farr again said: 'No, I did not ... .' D took the stand and denied any intent to participate in robberies, asserting that Farr alone had planned to commit them. In closing, P homed in on Farr's testimony that D said he would 'take care' of any trouble arising during the robbery. D was sentenced to death. Through direct appeal and state collateral review proceedings, P continued to hold secret the key witnesses' links to the police and allowed their false statements to stand uncorrected. Eventually, all the facts were discovered and D filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. D reasserted that P had withheld material exculpatory evidence 'reveal[ing] Farr as a police informant and D's arrest as a set-up.' P had concealed 'Cook's enormous incentive to testify in a manner favorable to the [prosecution].' The Magistrate Judge recommended a writ of habeas corpus with respect to D's death sentence, but not his conviction. Finding no convincing evidence of a deal between P and Cook, she recommended that the guilt-phase verdict remain undisturbed. The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's report. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment of the District Court to the extent that it granted relief on the Farr Brady claim and denied a certificate of appealability on the Cook Brady claim. Farr's status as an informant was not 'material' for Brady purposes. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.