Nature of the Case
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Facts
Algonquin Gas Transmission Company, employed Bailey (Ps) to excavate a trench and lay a gas line. Ps alleged that they suffered personal injuries while they were during the work and that Ds' negligence caused these injuries. Ps alleged that Ds knew or should have known that the soil and groundwater that plaintiffs excavated had been contaminated with various toxic chemicals. D filed an answer denying these allegations. In March 1997, Ps propounded a request to D for the production of relevant documents. D failed to respond. A motion and an order compelling D to produce the requested documents, a conditional default order, the entry of a default, a hearing on damages, and, finally, a default judgment, in August 1999 transpired. Despite proper service of these court papers on D's lawyer, Coffey, and his receipt of several commendable letters from Ps' lawyer entreating him to comply, Coffey failed to respond. An execution on the judgment issued on September 7, 1999, and Ps caused it to be duly served on D. D realized that its own lawyer had been asleep at the switch. D engaged new counsel who, on October 1999, filed a motion to vacate the judgment. For many years Coffey had handled various types of legal work for D. During 1999, when this lawsuit was pending D was providing Coffey with an office, absorbing certain of his administrative expenses, and paying him a retainer of $15,500 per month. At quarterly meetings, Coffey would report to D on the status of this case and on the various other legal matters. Coffey recalled receiving in the mail a request for document production in this case. Coffey also testified he did not inform anyone at D about it. Coffey admitted that he did not respond to the request for production or to the motion to compel. When D asked him about this case at its quarterly meetings, Coffey testified, he would tell his client that nothing was happening. Coffey had done nothing in the case from the time he first had received the request for production in March 1997, up to the time he received the notice of execution on the default judgment in September 1999. The only mitigation offered was that Coffey was imbibing heavily during this time by consuming eight to ten glasses of wine per day. Coffey blamed alcoholism. D based its motion to vacate on Rule 60(b)(1) and (6). Rule 60(b)(1) provides that a party may be relieved from a final judgment for 'mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.' Rule 60(b)(6) allows relief for 'any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.' The court held that there was no causal connection between Coffey's tippling and his failure to handle this case properly, noting that Coffey had competently managed various other legal matters for D during the same period he was ignoring the discovery requirements in this case. The motion justice concluded that Coffey's failure to respond did not constitute excusable neglect, but rather it was the result of either unexplained or willful conduct. The court denied the motion and D appealed to this Court.
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