Anderson v. Corporation Commission

327 P.2d 699 (1957)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

P was the owner of 36.96% of the fee in a forty-acre tract of land. Ellison (D) was the owner of 25.2% of the leasehold estate in the adjoining forty acres. The two tracts had been by prior order of the D, designated as a single drilling or spacing unit in which the parties' respective percentage interests were one half that in the individual forties as above set out. On May 11, 1955, on the application of Ellison (D), D made an order finding the percentage ownership of said unit and that all other owners except P had agreed with Ellison (D) on a plan of development of the unit. Ellison (D) was authorized to drill a well, the cost of completing the same being near $300,000. P was authorized to participate in the working or lessee interest by paying Ellison (D) his proportionate share of the drilling and completion costs of the well. D further found that $800 per acre was the reasonable bonus value of the leasehold and ordered that P have the option of electing to participate in the working interest in the well or to accept from Ellison (D) a $800 per acre bonus for a lease on his undivided interest. If P had not made an election within thirty days thereafter, he would be presumed to have 'elected to take the said 800 per acre bonus for the acreage owned by him underlying said tract.' P appealed. P claimed that from the pooling and unitization order, a co-tenancy relationship was created between himself and Ellison (D) and that D's order was in violation of the rights of co-tenants and outside the authority conferred by the statute -- 52 O.S.1951 § 87.1; that, if said statute authorized the order, it violates the provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions in that it amounted to a taking of private property for private use and without due process of law; that, if said statute authorized that order, it is further unconstitutional in that it compels citizens to contract against their wills and it also impairs vested contractual rights; and lastly, that D could not exercise such judicial powers except by a due process of law wherein a litigant is entitled to a trial by jury.