Ajemian v. Yahoo, Inc.

84 N.E.3d 766 (2017)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

On August 10, 2006, forty-three-year-old John Ajemian died in a bicycle accident; he had no will. He left behind an e-mail account that he and his brother, Robert Ajemian, had opened four years earlier; he left no instructions regarding the treatment of the account. Robert and Marianne Ajemian (Ps), John's siblings, were appointed as personal representatives of their brother's estate. In that capacity, they sought access to the contents of the e-mail account. While providing certain descriptive information, Yahoo (D) declined to provide access to the account, claiming that it was prohibited from doing so by certain requirements of the Stored Communications Act (SCA). D also maintained that the terms of service governing the e-mail account provided it with the discretion to reject the personal representatives' request. Ps commenced an action in the Probate Family Court. D argued that the SCA prohibits D from voluntarily disclosing the contents and it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the basis of the terms of service agreement, claiming thereby to have discretion to decline the requested access. The court granted D's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the requested disclosure was prohibited by the SCA. Ps appealed. The Appeals Court vacated the judgment and remanded the matter. On remand, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Ps claimed that they were entitled to access the contents because those contents were property of the estate. D again claimed the SCA prohibited the requested disclosure and, even if it did not, any common-law property right that the decedent otherwise might have had in the contents of the e-mail account had been contractually limited by the terms of service. It claimed the terms of service granted it the right to deny access to, and even delete the contents of, the account at its sole discretion, thereby permitting it to refuse Ps' request. The judge allowed D's motion for summary judgment solely on the basis that the SCA barred D from complying with the requested disclosure. The judge determined that there were disputed issues of material fact concerning the formation of the personal services agreement. The judge accordingly denied D's motion for summary judgment on this separate basis. Ps appealed, and this court transferred the case on its own motion.