P murdered Robert Weaver, his 7-year-old daughter Tisha Weaver, and his grandmother Katherine Gumina. P knew that Robert owned a $2,000 gun collection, and after spending a day drinking, P decided he wanted to steal the guns. He grabbed a baseball bat, beat Robert into unconsciousness, and headed indoors to find the collection. Once inside, P encountered Gumina, who was watching television, and Tisha, who was coloring in a workbook. Jones struck Gumina hard enough to crack her skull, leaving her unconscious on the living room floor. Tisha ran to hide under her parents’ bed. P dragged the girl out from under the bed before beating her hard enough “to create a wound several inches wide, extending from her left ear to her left cheek.” P then asphyxiated Tisha with a pillow. P began loading Robert’s guns into Gumina’s car. Robert regained consciousness. “Blood smears at the scene showed that Robert attempted to run from” P, but P “struck [him] in the head several more times. The last blow . . . was delivered while [Robert] knelt helplessly on the floor of the garage.” P used the guns to pay for a trip to Las Vegas. Robert’s wife came home from work and discovered the gruesome scene. The first responders found that Robert and Tisha were already dead. Gumina lived for 17 months before succumbing to her injuries. Before Gumina died, P was charged with two counts of premeditated first-degree murder and one count of attempted premeditated first-degree murder, and a jury found him guilty on all three charges. Under Arizona law, the court was required to “impose a sentence of death” if it found “one or more” statutorily enumerated “aggravating circumstances” and “no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” The trial court found three aggravating circumstances. P committed multiple homicides “during the commission of the offense.” P was motivated by “pecuniary” gain. The murders were “especially heinous, cruel or depraved.” With respect to Tisha’s murder, the court found an additional aggravating circumstance: She was a young child. The mitigating evidence was that P was abused as a child, began using drugs and alcohol at age 13, suffered brain trauma at ages 9 and 18, and had received “psychiatric treatments” as a child. P's father and first stepfather were physically abusive, that P’s grandfather and uncle had introduced him to drugs as a preteen, and that P had suffered several head injuries that left him with “constant” headaches. Dr. Potts identified several “mitigating factors” that he thought warranted leniency.P “was reared in a chaotic and at times grossly hostile environment where physical abuse was too prevalent.” Dr. Potts suggested that P’s “serious head trauma” potentially “contributed to his behavior.” He concluded with a “reasonable degree of medical certainty” that P “suffers from a major mental illness,” likely a “form of Bipolar Affective Disorder.” He thought P was “genetically” predisposed to “substance abuse” and speculated that P would not have murdered had he been sober. Dr. Potts believed that P felt “remorse and responsibility” and that he had the “potential for rehabilitation.” he trial court concluded that P had established four mitigating circumstances: (1) P suffered from long-term substance abuse; (2) that problem may be caused by genetic factors and head trauma; (3) he was under the influence of alcohol and drugs at the time of the murders; and (4) he was abused as a child. The court concluded that these circumstances were “not sufficiently substantial to outweigh the aggravating circumstances,” so it sentenced P to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed after “review[ing] the entire record” and “independently weighing all of the aggravating and mitigating evidence presented.” On state postconviction review, P claimed that defense counsel was ineffective. P argued that his attorney should have retained an independent neuropsychologist, rather than relying on Dr. Potts. The state court rejected it on the merits. P sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court, which was denied. P filed a habeas petition in Federal District Court and reasserted his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. The District Court held that P could not show prejudice because the additional information “‘barely . . . alter[ed] the sentencing profile presented to the sentencing judge.’” The Ninth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court vacated that judgment and remanded for the Ninth Circuit to determine whether, in light of Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U. S. 170 (2011), it had been proper to consider the new evidence presented at the federal evidentiary hearing. The Ninth Circuit again granted habeas relief. The panel held that it was permissible to consider the new evidence and concluded that there was a “reasonable probability” that “P would not have received a death sentence” if that evidence had been presented at sentencing. D appealed.

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