This section contains the nature of the case and procedural background.

P, a real estate developer, was interested in purchasing and developing several residences on a 10-acre portion of D’s 12.29-acre parcel of land. County approvals for a parcel split and development permits were required. D had previously rejected an offer from a different party for $750,000 because that party wanted D to obtain the required approval and permits. The written agreement between P and D, prepared by P, provided the sales prices of a 10-acre parcel for $500,000 in 3 years, if P decided to purchase the property after pursuing, at his own expense, the county approvals and permits. Paragraph 7 of the “Contingencies” section of the agreement provided that P was not obliged to do anything and could cancel the transaction at any time at his “absolute and sole discretion … .” P and D signed, and P began pursuing the necessary county approvals, spending thousands of dollars. In May and August 2004, D cooperated with P’s efforts by signing, among other things, an application to the county planning department for a tentative parcel map. In October 2004, D asked the title company to cancel escrow and told P he no longer wanted to sell the property. P proceeded and obtained approval for a tentative map. P filed suit seeking specific performance. D claimed the agreement was unsupported by consideration. The trial court concluded that the agreement was unenforceable because it was an option agreement that was not supported by any consideration. The trial court noted that no money was paid to D for his grant of the option to purchase the property, nor did he receive any other benefit or thing of value in exchange for the option. The court rejected P's claim that the agreement obligated P to expeditiously proceed with the parcel split and that their work and expenses constituted sufficient consideration for the option. The court reasoned that the adequacy of consideration is measured as of the time a contract is entered into and pointed out that the agreement did not bind P to do anything; rather, it gave P the power to terminate the transaction at any time. The court rejected P's claim that, in the absence of consideration for the option, their efforts merited applying the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The Court of Appeal affirmed

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