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On August 29, 1984, Harvey, complaining of back pain, made a visit to his physician, Dr. Dobyns. Dr. Dobyns prescribed two drugs, Xanax and Tylenol, and advised Harvey to return in two days for a follow-up examination. The doctor warned Harvey, a pilot, that the drugs would cause sedation and that he should not fly, drive, or operate machinery. The following evening, after taking the medication, Harvey shot himself in the head following an argument with his wife. He died in the hospital a few hours later. Tests performed indicated the presence in his system of Xanax, Tylenol, and codeine, as well as another CNS depressant, meprobromate. P, as personal representative of the estate, sued D, the manufacturer of Xanax. P asserted claims under strict products liability, breach of warranty, and negligence. In her strict liability claim, P alleged that Xanax was defective both in its design and in its failure to include adequate warnings. P alleged that d was 'both strictly liable per se and negligent per se' based on a failure to warn in violation of AS 17.20.290(1) of the Alaska Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. P sought damages for wrongful death and for Harvey's pain and suffering, as well as punitive damages. The superior court granted D's motions dismissing the design defect, warranty, negligent failure to warn, and the negligence per se claims. The strict liability failure to warn claim went to trial. P introduced evidence that D knew of numerous episodes of patients who had exhibited suicidal tendencies or who had committed suicide while undergoing treatment with Xanax, both before and after Harvey's suicide. D offered expert testimony that Xanax does not cause suicidal ideation and behavior. The parties also introduced conflicting evidence regarding the adequacy of the warnings on the Xanax package insert. Both parties submitted proposed jury instructions to the superior court. Among those proposed by Shanks were separate instructions on negligence, strict products liability, and negligence per se. The superior court refused to instruct the jury on strict liability design defect and negligence per se. The court instructed on the strict liability failure to warn theory on negligence principles alone. D got the verdict in a holding that D was not negligent in failing to adequately warn and direct Harvey’s physician regarding the effects of Xanax. The superior court ordered the estate to pay D $225,000.00 in attorney's fees. P's motion for J.N.O.V. or, in the alternative, for a new trial, in which she alleged misconduct by D's counsel, was denied. P appealed.

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