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In 1999, the Horry County Council created an official map to 'show the location of existing or proposed public streets, highways and utility right-of-ways, public building sites and public open spaces.' The Ordinance provided that after the official map was adopted, 'no building, structure, or other improvement, shall hereinafter be erected, constructed, enlarged or placed within the reservation area . . . without prior exemption or exception . . . .' In 2002, Horry County Council adopted Ordinance 88-202 to add 'the right-of-way identified as Alternative 1 for the proposed Carolina Bays Parkway . . . as shown in the document entitled 'Carolina Bays Parkway, Phase V FEIS Conceptual Roadway Plans.'' In 2006, Peachtree Properties purchased 131.40 acres for $22,500,000 in Horry County to develop as a residential subdivision. Peachtree financed the purchase with two mortgage loans, granting a first mortgage to R.E. Loans, LLC (REL) and a second mortgage to P. Both REL and P received title insurance from D. Both policies, printed on a 1992 standard form of the American Land Title Association, excluded: 2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on the title; 3. Unmarketability of the title . . . . In 2017, Peachtree defaulted. P foreclosed and successfully bid on the Property at the sale, and received a master's deed subject to the REL mortgage. In 2009, the South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT) filed an eminent domain action against P to take 10.18 acres of the Property for the Carolina Bay Parkway. The REL mortgage was assigned to Lynx Jericho. In 2014, a jury awarded P $2.1 million as just compensation for the taking. All during the 5-year litigation, P and Lynx Jericho submitted title insurance claims to D, which D denied. P and Lynx Jericho sued D for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and bad faith refusal to pay insurance benefits. A special referee denied Ps' motion for summary judgment and granted D summary judgment, ruling: 1) the Ordinance did not create a defect or encumbrance on the Property; 2) the Ordinance did not make title to the Property unmarketable; 3) exclusions 1, 2 and 3(d) barred coverage; and 4) Chicago Title did not act in bad faith by contesting Ps appealed.

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