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Family Code section 7613 states that the donor of semen provided to a licensed physician and surgeon or to a licensed sperm bank is treated in law as if he were not the natural parent of a child unless otherwise agreed to in a writing signed by the donor and the woman prior to the conception of the child. P filed a petition to establish a parental relationship with Gus S., a child born to Danielle S. (D). D argued that P was a sperm donor under section 7613(b) and therefore was not the natural father as a matter of law. D contends that (1) he is not a sperm donor within the meaning of section 7613(b); (2) he is a presumed parent under section 7611 (d); (3) D is estopped from denying P's parental relationship; and (4) it would be unconstitutional to deny P an opportunity to establish legal paternity under the facts of the case. P and D cohabitated for many years, but they never married. Gus was conceived through in vitro fertilization and P provided to a licensed fertility clinic the sperm used in the IVF procedure. P and D have been trying to have a child since 2006. In May 2008, D moved out and bought a home nearby. She purchased sperm from a bank and told P she was going to pursue motherhood as a single mother. She also learned about 7613. n September 2008, she moved back into P's house while the house she bought was being remodeled. In November 2008 D gave P a letter in which he wrote that he was not ready to be a father, but if she wanted to use his sperm to conceive, she had his blessing as long as she did not tell others. D decided to try an IVF procedure. P and D both signed a series of informed consent forms. The procedure was successful, and Gus was born in December 2009. P continued to maintain contact with Gus until the middle of 2012 when D terminated her relationship with P. The trial court rejected P's argument that section 7613(b) does not apply. The trial court also rejected estoppel arguments. The trial court found that P could not establish paternity under section 7611(d) because section 7613(b) is the exclusive means of determining paternity in cases involving sperm donors and unmarried women. P appealed.

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