H and W were married in 1966, and they resided together until eight months before their marriage was dissolved in January 1981. No children were born during the marriage. At the time of the divorce, Eugene was 52 years old and had been retired, due to poor health, for four years. Kate was 50 years old and had not worked since 1974. H was ordered to pay her $221.50 per month as maintenance, which is the same monthly amount that the court had ordered him to pay as temporary maintenance in December 1980. To enforce the maintenance provision of their dissolution-of-marriage judgment, W initiated contempt proceedings against H. At the time of the hearing, H was still unable to work. He had remarried, and his new wife taught school but would soon retire. H’s monthly income had increased since the dissolution of marriage and now totaled $922.44. H was purposefully vague about all of his financial obligations between him and his new wife. H testified to extensive health problems. However, his responses to cross-examination revealed that health insurance fully paid his hospital expenses and that Medicare paid a portion of his other medical and dental costs. As for W, because her mother required extensive care, she could not obtain a job that would require her to leave home for more than a few hours at a time. W also conceded, however, that she had not sought work that she could do in her home. The trial court determined a maintenance arrearage, entered judgment for that amount and found H in contempt of court for his failure to pay. H filed a motion to reconsider this order. As a defense to the contempt finding, he claimed that all of his monthly income -- which consists of social security, a private pension, and a disability insurance benefit -- is exempt from judgment under section 12 -- 1001 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 12 -- 1001). The trial court rejected this defense, denied H's motion to reconsider, and held that section 12 -- 1001 is invalid because its phrase 'exempt from judgment' is unconstitutionally vague. Because a statute of this State was held to be invalid, H appealed directly to this court pursuant to Rule 302(a)(1) (87 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)(1)).

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