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H and W obtained a decree dissolving their marriage, which included an agreement as to property division, child support, and maintenance. W would receive cash payments totaling $93,200. In addition, she was to receive a promissory note from H in the amount of $75,000 secured by a deed of trust on the family home. The note and $75,000 of the cash represented one-half of the equity that had accumulated in the family home as of the time of the dissolution. The remainder of the cash payments represented the value of a fur coat and a Jaguar automobile surrendered by W to H. H made the cash payments and gave a secured note as provided for in the stipulation. H obtained $3,200 of the cash through a loan from a friend. He obtained the remaining $90,000 through a loan from Arapahoe Bank & Trust, secured by a second deed of trust on the family home. On the same day that she received the $90,000, W invested $88,413.02 in a house. She sold the residence on July 9, 1980, and received $ 89,593.74 as proceeds of the sale. She immediately transferred $75,000 of that money to a bank in Florida. Soon after, W purchased an interest in a home in Florida, spending almost $44,000 to buy the interest and to redecorate the home. Within several months of the purchase, she had spent the remaining proceeds of approximately $45,000 that she had received from the sale of the Driver Lane residence. H's employer, UMC, discovered that H had embezzled $589,823.24 from UMC during 1979 and 1980. The trial court found that $190,000 of UMC's money was used to pay for the construction of the family home, approximately $40,000 was used to buy furnishings for the home, $13,000 was used to purchase the Jaguar automobile, and $3,200 went to repay the loan that H had received from his friend. UMC brought a civil action to recover the stolen money from H. H then conveyed the family home to UMC. He also filed a post-judgment motion in the dissolution of marriage action, requesting that the trial court set aside the stipulated permanent orders that had been incorporated into the decree of dissolution. UMC filed a motion to intervene in the dissolution action, and the trial court granted that motion. UMC asked that the permanent orders be set aside because they were based on a fraudulent misrepresentation of marital assets to the court and because they divided property that belonged to UMC. UMC sought a constructive trust and an equitable lien on the Driver Lane residence and a constructive trust on the promissory note and on the deed of trust on the family home securing that note. The court refused to reopen the dissolution. It ruled that W was a bona fide purchaser for value and that, therefore, UMC could not obtain a constructive trust on the promissory note, the deed of trust, or the proceeds of the sale of the Driver Lane residence. UMC appealed, and the court of appeals reversed. It held that 18-4-405, 8 C.R.S. (1978) entitled UMC to impose a constructive trust on any proceeds of the embezzlement that UMC can trace. W appealed.

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