Dudley v. Offender Aid And Restoration Of Richmond, Inc.
401 S.E. 2d 878, 241 Va. 270 (1991)
Issues
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Nature Of The Case
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Facts
Timothy Wilson Spencer was 25 years old in 1987. When he was nine, he was charged with larceny and setting fire to a school. He was charged with larceny again at age 11 and burglary at age 14. At age 15, he was committed to a juvenile correctional center. Released on supervision the following year, he was again arrested within eight months on burglary charges. He was committed to the Beaumont Learning Center. One year after his release from that confinement, he was sentenced as an adult to five years in the Virginia State Penitentiary for another burglary. He was released on mandatory parole on December 14, 1981, after serving six months in prison. Within a month, he was arrested on three new charges. His parole was revoked, and he was returned to custody. Spencer was again released on parole in May 1983, but in January 1984 was again arrested on two additional burglary charges. In 1986 and again in 1987, the parole board denied him parole because he was an 'unacceptable parole risk.' His mandatory release date was not to be until 1991. Spencer was such a model prisoner that he hardly committed any felonies while incarcerated. (Said with great sarcasm). Spencer was evaluated by psychologists as 'a potential disciplinary and security problem.' D owned and operated a residential pre-release facility intended to acclimate and prepare convicts for eventual release from prison to free society. D had a contract with the Virginia Department of Corrections. D would receive inmates from penal institutions who met certain criteria: mandatory parolees, revoked parolees with less than six months remaining to serve, and inmates granted parole. Inmates who demonstrated a pattern of violence were ineligible. Spencer met none of the contractual criteria, but was received by D on September 4, 1987, and moved into the 'Hospitality House.' 'Hospitality House' was filthy and ill-kept, and the residents were essentially unsupervised. Three of the four supervising personnel were themselves convicted criminals having histories which included prostitution, burglary, and malicious wounding. Security measures were practically nonexistent. The alarm system was easily disabled by the inmates, permitting them to enter and leave freely during the night. Windows were unsecured. Spencer's room had a window opening onto a fire escape, which gave him unrestricted access to the ground outside. Inmates were permitted to leave during the day, and a log was maintained in which they were to 'sign out' and 'sign in' so that the supervisory personnel could monitor their whereabouts. In practice, the system was not enforced. On September 19, 1987, Spencer was unaccounted for at the 'head count' between 7:00 and 8:00 p.m. During that night, Spencer broke open a kitchen window in the apartment of Debbie Dudley Davis at 4520 Devonshire Road, just a short distance from the 'Hospitality House.' Spencer bound Debbie Davis, beat and raped her, and murdered her by strangulation. Spencer returned to the 'Hospitality House' and signed in, claiming he was late. D made no inquiry into his activities. P sued D to recover compensatory and punitive damages for both the non-fatal and fatal personal injuries suffered by Debbie. P alleged that D had a duty to exercise reasonable care in its supervision of Spencer for the protection of innocent members of the public, including the decedent, and that the injuries she suffered were the proximate result of D's breach of that duty. D demurred, claiming it had no 'special relationship' with Debbie Dudley Davis and, therefore, owed her no actionable duty to control Spencer. The court sustained the demurrer based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319 (1965) which provides: 'One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm.' P appealed.
Rule Of Law
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Holding & Decision
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Legal Analysis
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