This section contains the nature of the case and procedural background.

D.B.S. was ordered to go to Fort Benning for basic training. While in training, D.B.S. required emergency medical care for an intestinal condition. He underwent surgery and blood transfusions at the Martin Army Community Hospital (MACH). D.B.S. completed the training and returned to his home in Minnesota in December 1983. In November 1984, he married N.A.S., and they had three children, including C.R.S., who was born in June 1987. In late 1987, the Minnesota National Guard discharged D.B.S. In early 1989, Ps discovered that they had tested positive for the presence of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) after undergoing blood tests. In the summer of 1992, Donor 3903, one of nine donors whose blood MACH had used in D.B.S.'s transfusions, also tested HIV positive. In 1983, public health officials and blood banks were struggling to address the AIDS crisis. There was no HIV test. In March 1983, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the American Association of Blood Banks (AABB) issued recommendations concerning procedures for screening donors for AIDS. The recommendations suggested educating donors about AIDS, questioning them about the early signs of AIDS, and asking those in high risk groups not to give blood. These procedures relied on voluntary self-deferral by high risk donors and did not include measures such as direct questioning. In a memorandum dated April 12, 1983, the Military Blood Program Office (MBPO) adopted the FDA/AABB guidelines, which were applicable to private sector blood banks. The MBPO was responsible for 'developing, recommending and monitoring policies (fully coordinated with the Military Departments) on . . . the collection, procurement, processing, storage, distribution, and management of whole blood.' MBPO was to 'maintain and disseminate plans for coordinating the collection, processing, distribution, and management of blood and blood components necessary to meet the requirements of the Military Departments.' The MBPO staff consisted of only three people. It often relied on FDA and AABB regulations in formulating military blood bank policies. Capt. James Bates, the Director of the MBPO in 1983, testified that the MBPO did not consider adopting different procedures for the military. Thus, when Donor 3903 gave blood in August 1983, MACH's blood bank had in place the procedures outlined in the MBPO memorandum, which included providing information about AIDS to potential donors, identifying high-risk groups, asking that members of these groups refrain from donating, and distributing cards that prospective donors filled out that were updated to reflect concerns about AIDS. The FDA/AABB guidelines did not call for notifying recipients of blood that they could have received infected blood. In 1985, the Department of Defense began testing active members of the military for HIV infection. In February 1986, the Army Surgeon General circulated guidelines classifying those who received transfusions between January 1980 and July 1985 as being at high risk for HIV exposure. The guidelines then described ways to identify, notify, evaluate, and counsel such individuals. Ps sued D after four government agencies rejected their administrative claims. Ps claimed D was negligent in adopting the FDA/AABB blood donor screening procedures and was negligent in later failing to warn D.B.S. of the risk that he had received contaminated blood at MACH. D eventually asserted the discretionary function exception to the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988), and the district court granted this motion, finding that § 2680(a) barred all claims. Ps appealed.

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