P, a Pennsylvania resident, was a partner in a prominent Delaware law firm.2 On August 5, he filed a pro se complaint against the Unionville-Chadds Ford (Pennsylvania) School District in a Pennsylvania state court (the 'Unionville Lawsuit'). P had been an outspoken opponent of the district's efforts to retire the Unionville High School mascot, which took the form of the letter 'U' draped by a feather, a vestige of the high school's nickname-the 'Indians.' Less than an hour later, D sent the following email to P's employer, Bayard, P.A., with the subject line 'Recently Filed Lawsuit Against Unionville Chadds Ford School District Reflects Poorly on the Bayard Firm.' “We hope you can reflect upon how shockingly racist and tone deaf this suit is, particularly in light of the present demands against the school board, which has to deal with getting students back to school safely in the midst of a deadly pandemic.” “…to perpetuating an offensive and outdated school mascot. We raise these issues solely in our capacity as concerned parents and taxpayers; as such, we are reaching out to you in the hope your firm is better than throwing its support behind this horrific lawsuit.” The next day Bayard's firm administrator emailed P to inform him of the firm's receipt of D's letter, noting, among other things, that 'there are some unhappy individuals over the filing' of the Unionville Lawsuit. Three hours later the firm demanded P’s resignation. P resigned. Potential employer asked P about 'his unannounced and sudden departure from Bayard.' Despite inquiries or applications to over 50 potential employers-over 40 in-house counsel opportunities and over 15 law firms, according to the complaint-Cousins was unable to find suitable employment. In October 2020, P started his own law firm. P filed a four-count complaint alleging that D tortiously interfered with his employment agreement with Bayard, defamed him with her email, and conspired with unnamed Ds to injure him. P claimed that these unnamed defendants aided and abetted Goodier in violating his rights. D moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. D argued that everything said in D’s letter was a First Amendment privilege. The court categorized the accusations in the email as ''subjective speculation' or 'merely rhetorical hyperbole'' and thus not actionable. The Superior Court concluded that D's email did not communicate false statements of fact but instead expressed 'non-actionable opinion.' The court found that D had 'made it clear that she was critiquing P's lawsuit, which had been the subject of media coverage and had been reviewed by members of Bayard.' The Superior Court then ruled on P's tortious-interference-with-contract, civil-conspiracy, and aiding-and-abetting claims and dismissed them on two grounds. The court held that, 'if D's statements are not actionable as defamation, they are not actionable as tortious interference with contract, conspiracy, or aiding or abetting.' It held that P's tortious interference claim failed in the absence of an allegation that D's sole motivation was to interfere with P's employment contract with Bayard. P appealed. P maintains that tortious interference can lie even where the only asserted interference takes the form of otherwise protected speech. D responds that the First Amendment bars any tortious interference claim that 'rests on the same predicate act' as a failed defamation claim.

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