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This section contains the nature of the case and procedural background.

Ds purchased a house on a four-acre lot. The property (the Dominant Estate) lacked access to a public road except by means of three recorded, physically overlapping easements across part of an 80-acre parcel of land (the Servient Estate), which partially surrounded their property. The property was originally purchased in an 84-acre lot. Those owners granted their son-in-law the 4-acre lot along with an easement. They granted a second right-of-way easement along the same course but it was 66 feet wide. This made it possible for the easement to be converted into a public road. By 1997, the Servient Estate was owned 50/50 by a Trust and the daughter and son-in-law of the owners of the original 84 acres. P offered to purchase the Servient Estate from the Chviliceks and the Trust, with the intention of developing a subdivision. The 1998 deeds expressly recognized a 30-foot-wide private road easement on the same location as the 1960 and 1961 easements. The two deeds also reserved to the grantors all 'recorded and/or existing easements and right of way reservations.' In 2000, the Dominant Estate was sold to Ds. P proposed to give Ds access to Highway 31 via a cul-de-sac, which would connect with Cobblestone Drive, which in turn would connect with Highway 31. P would develop about seven lots over Ds' easements and Ds would be required to reconfigure their driveway so that it connected with P's proposed cul-de-sac. Ds have refused to modify their right-of-way easements. P's plan would put Ds' house in an odd position relative to the cul-de-sac and the neighboring houses, require them to change their street address, and replace their direct access to Highway 31 with a circuitous route. P sought a declaratory judgment that the easements terminated once P provided alternate public road access to the Dominant Estate. The Judge ruled that the 1998 easement would terminate once P provided public road access, regardless of the location, but the 1961 easement of 66 feet would remain in effect even after P provided the Dominant Estate with alternate public road access. Both parties appealed. The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's holding that the 66-foot easement would continue. It held that both easements should be modified under the doctrine of changed conditions to avoid a 'grossly inefficient allocation of resources.' Ds appealed.

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