Woodside Village Condominium Association, Inc. v. Jahre

806 So.2d 452 (Fla. 2002)

Purchase the Printed Copy at bsmsphd.com

Nature of the Case

To access this section all you need to do is click here and register.

Facts

The original Declaration of Condominium allowed the condos to be leased for any period of one (1) year or less, and may be leased by successive leases for periods in excess of one (1) year without the approval of the Board of Directors of the Association. But if P finds during the term of any such lease that the lessee has violated the rules and regulations or the terms and provisions of the Declaration of Condominium or that the lessee has been the cause of a nuisance or annoyance then P may so notify lessor of its disapproval of such lessee in writing and lessor shall be precluded from extending any lease to said lessee without the written approval of P. In 1997 owners became concerned that units were increasingly becoming non-owner occupied. This would have a negative impact on the quality of life in Woodside Village and on the market value of units. They amended the limit for the leasing of units to a term of no more than nine months in any twelve-month period. A provision was also added prohibiting owners from leasing their units during the first twelve months of ownership. These amendments were adopted by a vote of at least two-thirds of the unit owners as required by the Declaration. Under the new rules, all leases, subleases, or assignments of leases and all renewals of such must first be submitted to the Board of Directors for approval or disapproval. No record owner was allowed to lease more than three of their units at any one time. D got notice that two of their units were not in compliance with the new rules. P filed complaints seeking injunctions to enforce compliance with the rules. D counterclaimed contending that the lease restriction was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious, and had no purpose other than to effectively ban all leasing of units. D claimed it was confiscatory and deprived them of lawful uses which were permissible at the time of purchase. D sought an injunction prohibiting P from enforcing the lease restriction or, alternatively, requiring O to compensate P for the fair market value of their units. The circuit court granted summary judgment in D's favor. The lease restriction impermissibly 'creates more than one class of ownership because it cannot be applied retroactively against unit owners who purchased their unit prior to the date of the amendment.' The Second District affirmed the trial court's final summary judgment and held that the lease restriction could not be enforced because it was adopted after the respondents acquired their units and no significant lease restrictions existed when respondents purchased their units. P appealed.