P instituted a medical malpractice action against Ds alleging the failure to adhere to the accepted standard of medical care in connection with the birth of their daughter, Diana, resulting in Diana's cerebral palsy. P claims Ds deviated from accepted standards of care while administering the drug Pitocin to hasten contractions during labor, because they negligently monitored Diana's fetal heart rate and, as a result, failed to timely discontinue the use of Pitocin, causing Diana to be deprived of oxygen. Experts testified that the cerebral palsy was caused by birth asphyxia within the last one and one-half hours of birth while Pitocin was being administered. All experts agreed at trial that it was appropriate to give Pitocin to enhance the contractions and that fetal monitoring was necessary. According to P's experts, there is no evidence that the fetal monitor was ever read, that the strips were unreadable and that they showed fetal distress. They claim when the strip became unreadable, the nurses should have discontinued the Pitocin and notified the doctor so that he could determine the appropriate course of action. D testified that the decision to use an internal scalp monitor is a medical judgment that requires the weighing of the risk of infection with the benefits of the monitor readings. D testified that the monitoring strips did not indicate that Diana was experiencing difficulty; and that other delivery options were foreclosed by the passage of time and the risk-benefit analysis. D's expert testified that the strips were readable and did not reveal fetal distress. The court gave a charge on exercise of judgment. The verdict went to Ds. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court decision. P appealed.