United States v. Wilso

421 U.S. 309 (1975)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

Wilson (D1) and Bryan (D2), along with one Robert Anderson, were charged in separate indictments with separate bank robberies. D1, and Anderson were charged with armed robbery of a bank in Tuxedo, N. Y. D2, and Anderson were charged with armed robbery of a bank in Mount Ivy, N. Y. Prior to Anderson's trial both Ds pleaded guilty to charges against them, but neither was immediately given a final sentence. At Anderson's trial for the two robberies, Ds were summoned as witnesses for the prosecution. When questioned, however, each refused to testify, contending that his answers might incriminate him. The judge then granted them immunity and ordered them to answer forthwith. He informed them that as long as they did not lie under oath, they could not be prosecuted by reason of any testimony, but that if they continued to refuse to answer, he would hold them in contempt. Ds nevertheless persisted in their refusals, and the judge summarily held them in contempt. Ds were both sentenced to six months' imprisonment, consecutive to any sentences imposed for the bank robberies. The judge made it clear that he would consider reducing the contempt sentences, or eliminating them completely, if Ds decided to testify. The trial proceeded, but without D2's testimony, the evidence against Anderson on the Mount Ivy robbery was such that at the end of the Government's case the judge granted Anderson's motion for acquittal. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the Tuxedo robbery. At a later trial, Anderson was convicted of that robbery. Ds appealed their contempt convictions. The Court of Appeals rejected the claim that their Fifth Amendment rights would have been violated by compelling them to testify after they had been granted immunity, but it accepted their contention that use of the summary contempt power was improper, and it remanded for proceedings under Rule 42 (b). The court reasoned that 'if . . . counsel had been given `a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense,' Fed. R. Crim P. Rule 42 (b), she might have marshaled and presented facts in mitigation of the charge.' The Supreme Court granted certiorari.