United States v. Thompso

190 F.Supp.2d 138 (2002)

Facts

D pled guilty to Count Five of a multi-count indictment, charging him with the distribution of cocaine base. D was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of sixty months, representing a downward departure of 17 months. The departure was based on D's extraordinary family circumstances. In sentencing, the issue was what set of facts comprises 'ordinary' family circumstances? The court did a comparison of D and the presentence reports of fifty-four defendants convicted of crack distribution in the District of Massachusetts. The case also raised another question: What was the underlying purpose of this departure -- to reward a defendant for a good life, or to address the impact of incarceration on innocent third parties? The court determined from its examination of like defendants that D's family circumstances were extraordinary. D barely knew his own father, who was in and out of jail throughout his life. D was twenty-four years old and had never before been incarcerated. D left high school when his girlfriend, Breii Murray, became pregnant. To take care of his child D became a member of Union Local 223 and maintained steady employment until his arrest on these charges. D supported his fiancée, and his daughters both financially and emotionally. He took his eldest daughter to school each day and participated in his daughters' care each day. D took his fiancée’s 80-year-old aunt to church each Sunday and contributed to her household expenses. Released pending trial, D continued to live his life along these lines. Even with the downward departure, D's final sentence was severe, particularly for a young man who had never before been in prison. He was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 60 months. The First Circuit vacated the defendant's sentence and remanded for re-sentencing. Thompson II answered the first question concerning the scope of comparison by holding that the proper approach is to compare any given defendant, regardless of the offense of which he has been convicted, to all defendants and not those similarly situated with respect to the offense of conviction. It did not answer the second question -- the purpose of this departure. Between the time of Thompson II and the instant re-sentencing, the First Circuit decided United States v. Pereira, 272 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2001), which apparently answered that question. The Court implied that the only issue of relevance in evaluating family departures under U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6 is the impact that a given sentencing can have on innocent third parties, not what family circumstances reflect about the defendant's culpability. A defendant who could not show that he was 'irreplaceable' to his or her family or 'otherwise extraordinary' could not under the circumstances of that case, qualify for a family circumstances departure. Once again D raised the same issue as before: a downward departure for extraordinary family circumstances. He sought also the benefit of the 'safety valve' under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, and argued for a departure based on his extraordinary post-sentencing rehabilitation.