This case is the first criminal prosecution in our Nation's history of a former President for actions taken during his Presidency. From January 2017 until January 2021, D served as President of the United States. A federal grand jury indicted D on four counts for conduct that occurred during his Presidency following the November 2020 election. It is alleged that D and his co-conspirators 'used knowingly false claims of election fraud to get state legislators and election officials to . . . change electoral votes for D's opponent, Joseph R. Biden, Jr., to electoral votes for D.' It is alleged that D 'organized fraudulent slates of electors in seven targeted states' and 'caused these fraudulent electors to transmit their false certificates to the Vice President and other government officials to be counted at the certification proceeding on January 6.' It is alleged that D and his co-conspirators attempted to use the Justice Department 'to conduct sham election crime investigations and to send a letter to the targeted states that falsely claimed that the Justice Department had identified significant concerns that may have impacted the election outcome.' It is alleged that D and his co-conspirators attempted to persuade 'the Vice President to use his ceremonial role at the January 6 certification proceeding to fraudulently alter the election results.' It is alleged that D and his co-conspirators 'repeated knowingly false claims of election fraud to gathered supporters, falsely told them that the Vice President had the authority to and might alter the election results, and directed them to the Capitol to obstruct the certification proceeding.' When 'a large and angry crowd . . . violently attacked the Capitol and halted the proceeding,' it is alleged that D and his co-conspirators 'exploited the disruption by redoubling efforts to levy false claims of election fraud and convince Members of Congress to further delay the certification.' The indictment charged D with (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U. S. C. §371, (2) conspiracy to obstruct an official proceeding in violation of §1512(k), (3) obstruction of and attempt to obstruct an official proceeding in violation of §1512(c)(2), §2, and (4) conspiracy against rights in violation of §241.[1] D moved to dismiss the indictment based on Presidential immunity, arguing that a President has absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions performed within the outer perimeter of his official responsibilities and that the indictment's allegations fell within the core of his official duties. D claimed that whle he was President he (1) 'made public statements about the administration of the federal election'; (2) communicated with senior Justice Department officials 'about investigating election fraud and about choosing the leadership' of the Department; (3) 'communicated with state officials about the administration of the federal election and their exercise of official duties with respect to it'; (4) 'communicated with the Vice President' and with 'Members of Congress about the exercise of their official duties regarding the election certification'; and (5) 'authorized or directed others to organize contingent slates of electors in furtherance of his attempts to convince the Vice President to exercise his official authority in a manner advocated for by President Trump.' The District Court denied D's motion to dismiss, holding that former Presidents do not possess federal criminal immunity for any acts. It claimed that 'the possibility of vexatious post-Presidency litigation is much reduced in the criminal context' in light of '[t]he robust procedural safeguards attendant to federal criminal prosecutions.' The D. C. Circuit affirmed. Both the District Court and the D. C. Circuit declined to decide whether the indicted conduct involved official acts. It distinguished between two kinds of official acts: discretionary and ministerial. It observed that 'although discretionary acts are `only politically examinable,' the judiciary has the power to hear cases' involving ministerial acts that an officer is directed to perform by the legislature. It reasoned that the fact that D's actions 'allegedly violated generally applicable criminal laws' meant that those actions 'were not properly within the scope of his lawful discretion.' It held that D had 'no structural immunity from the charges in the Indictment.' D appealed.