P and D began an intimate relationship. They purchased a home together, held joint bank accounts, and jointly owned their automobiles. They both contributed financially to their household, and each regarded the other as a life partner. They decided to have a child. They decided to adopt a child. D adopted a newborn baby girl, who was named Sarah Ruth Dexter-Titchenal. The parties held themselves out to Sarah and all others as her parents. The child called one parent 'Mama Chris' and the other parent 'Mama Di.' For the first three and one-half years of Sarah's life, until the parties' separation, P cared for the child approximately 65% of the time. P did not seek to adopt Sarah because the parties believed that the then-current adoption statute would not allow both of them to do so. By November 1994 D had moved out of the couple's home, taking Sarah with her. By the spring of 1995, D had severely curtailed P's contact with Sarah and had refused P's offer of financial assistance. P filed a complaint requesting that the superior court exercise its equitable jurisdiction to establish and enforce regular, unsupervised parent-child contact between her and Sarah. The court granted D's motion to dismiss, refusing to recognize a cause of action for parent-child contact absent a common-law or statutory basis for the claim. P appealed arguing that that the superior court has equitable jurisdiction under the state's parens patriae authority to consider her complaint, and that both public policy and the doctrines of in loco parentis and de facto parenthood allow the court to exercise its equitable authority in cases such as this.