Nature of the Case
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Facts
Diamond (D) sells and installs auto glass from several stores in Maryland. In 1993, Spriggs, (P) who is an African-American, went to work for D in customer service. Both the president of D and P’s immediate supervisor were white. P never entered into a written agreement for work and does not claim that D promised him orally or in writing any specific duration of employment of that he ever got an employee handbook regarding D’s policies. Between July 1993 and August 1995, P’s supervisor used racial slurs often in P’s presence. P quit his job because of this problem. One year later, the manager asked him to return to work and assured P that he would do his best to control the supervisor. P returned to work but the comments continued, and P left again on February 6, 1997. At the end of February, D wrote P and asked him to return to work and again assured P that the offender would be kept in check. When P got to work again, the supervisor immediately presented him with a list of new job duties, which P considered unreasonable and racially motivated. P permanently left D thereafter because he believed the improper conduct would continue. P then sued D, the president of D and his immediate supervisor claiming that he was subjected to severe racial harassment amounting to forced termination. P made his claims under 42. U.S.C. 1981. D moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action (FRCP 12(b)(6)). The district court granted the motion because P was an at will employee. The court reasoned that at will contracts confer no rights that are enforceable in an action ex contractu and cannot serve as a predicate for a section 1981 action. P appealed this dismissal.
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