Nature of the Case
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Facts
M and P attended Harvard Business School together and were in a committed relationship from 1989 through mid-2000. M was artificially inseminated with sperm from an anonymous donor and gave birth to Zachary. With M's consent and approval, P petitioned to adopt Zachary in a 'second parent' adoption, using official forms and procedures that expressly provided that M consented to Zachary's adoption by P but intended to retain her own parental rights. The trial court approved. Three years later M was inseminated again with sperm from the same anonymous donor and gave birth to Joshua. M signed an 'Independent Adoption Placement Agreement' (Agreement), which begins: 'Note to birth parent: This form will become a permanent and irrevocable consent to adoption. Do not sign this form unless you want the adopting parents named below to adopt your child.' The Agreement also recites that, upon the court's approval of the Agreement, M will 'give up all rights of custody, services, and earnings' with respect to Joshua. A written 'Addendum to Independent Adoption Placement Agreement' (Addendum), a form developed by the California Department of Social Services (CDSS), was signed. It stated M's intent, as Joshua's birth parent, to retain parental rights and control of Joshua while placing him with P for the purpose of independent adoption. These were essentially the same procedures and forms they had used for Zachary's adoption. CDSS recommended that the court grant P's adoption petition. The relationship was not going so well and M repeatedly requested postponement of the hearing on P's adoption petition. M asked P to move out of the family residence. The parties agreed on a temporary visitation schedule affording P time with both boys, but they could not reach an agreement respecting permanent custody or visitation. P then filed a motion for an order of adoption respecting Joshua, contending, inter alia, that M's consent had become irrevocable pursuant to section 8814.5 and that the adoption was in Joshua's best interest. M moved for court approval to withdraw her consent to the adoption. She contended there was no legal basis for the adoption, that her consent had been obtained by fraud or duress, and that withdrawal of her consent was in Joshua's best interest. M has a close and loving relationship with Joshua as his second parent. M obtained a domestic violence restraining order against P and moved to dismiss the adoption petition. The court denied the dismissal motions. It held that M had not attempted to withdraw her consent within the time required by law and that resolution of the adoption petition was likely to be based on Joshua's best interest. M filed a petition for a writ of mandate, joined in by counsel for Joshua, challenging the denial of her motion to dismiss. The court held that, except for stepparent adoptions, an adoption where a consenting parent does not relinquish all parental rights has no statutory basis. P petitioned for review.
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