Scott v. United State

436 U.S. 128 (1978)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

Government officials applied for authorization to wiretap a telephone registered to Geneva Jenkins. There was probable cause to believe nine individuals were participating in a conspiracy to import and distribute narcotics in the Washington, D.C., area and that Geneva Jenkins' telephone had been used in furtherance of the conspiracy, particularly by petitioner Thurmon, who was then living with Jenkins. The order also required the agents to conduct the wiretap in 'such a way as to minimize the interception of communications that are otherwise subject to interception' under the Act 3 and to report to the court every five days 'the progress of the interception and the nature of the communication intercepted.' Scott and Thurmon (Ds), moved to suppress all the intercepted conversations on a variety of grounds. After comprehensive discovery and an extensive series of hearings, the District Court held that the agents had failed to comply with the minimization requirement contained in the wiretap order and ordered suppression of the intercepted conversations and all derivative evidence. The court relied in large part on the fact that virtually all the conversations were intercepted while only 40% of them were shown to be narcotics-related. This, the court reasoned, 'strongly indicated the indiscriminate use of wire surveillance that was proscribed by Katz 4 and Berger.' 331 F. Supp. 233, 247 (DC 1971). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded, stating that the District Court should not have based its determination upon a general comparison of the number of narcotics-related calls with the total number of calls intercepted, but rather should have engaged in a particularized assessment of the reasonableness of the agents' attempts to minimize in light of the purpose of the wiretap and the information available to the agents at the time of interception. The District Court again ordered suppression, this time relying largely on the fact that the agents were aware of the minimization requirement, 'but made no attempt to comply therewith.' The Court of Appeals again reversed, holding that the District Court had yet to apply the correct standard. The court recognized that the 'presence or absence of a good faith attempt to minimize on the part of the agents is undoubtedly one factor to be considered in assessing whether the minimization requirement has been satisfied,' but went on to hold that 'the decision on the suppression motion must ultimately be based on the reasonableness of the actual interceptions and not on whether the agents subjectively intended to minimize their interceptions.' The Supreme Court granted certiorari.