Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young

94 P.3d 179 (2004)

Facts

P hired Das an associate attorney. D had spent the majority of his twelve-year legal career as general counsel for Rocky Mountain Helicopters, where he acquired considerable experience in helicopter crash litigation. D accepted a starting salary of $70,000 per year. P indicated to D that the firm would evaluate his performance after the first year and that, as a general rule, attorneys at P typically received increased compensation based on performance and positive results. P told D that, depending upon his performance, the usual partnership track for a lateral hire with D's experience ranged from two to three years. In 1996, D agreed to represent Krause, who had sustained serious injuries in a helicopter crash, in a personal injury action in Texas. D also undertook the representation of Mountain West Helicopters, the owner of the helicopter involved in Krause's accident, in a related lawsuit filed in federal court in Utah. D was the only lawyer at P who performed any work on either case. D spent considerable time on these two contingent fee cases, which resulted in lower collections and higher work-in-process figures.  Members of the firm began to question D's overall profitability and readiness to become a shareholder. D inquired as to how the contingent fee in the Krause case would be divided. P and D met on several occasions to negotiate an appropriate allocation of the Krause fee. Both communicated their intention to be 'fair' with each other in attempting to determine the amount of 'fair and equitable' compensation that D would receive from the Krause fee. A tentative verbal agreement was reached where D would take one-third of the Krause fee, with the remaining two-thirds going to the firm. P memorialized this proposal in writing and requested that D sign it to acknowledge his acceptance. D did not sign. On June 14, 1999, D learned that the Krause case had settled three days earlier at a mediation in Texas, which he did not attend, and that the contingent fee recovery would be nearly $650,000. The next day, without disclosing his knowledge of the settlement, D made a counteroffer to the firm's May 5 proposal. D agreed to divide the Krause fee one-third to himself and two-thirds to the firm, provided P made him a shareholder, allowed him a voice in that year's bonus distribution, and guaranteed an increased salary for the next two years. P promised him that the firm would fulfill these additional conditions upon the successful resolution of the Krause case. P denied making such promises, and the firm did not respond to D's proposal. On July 2, D wrote a memo to P, informing them that he would leave in two weeks if an agreement could not be reached on his counteroffer. The firm accepted D's resignation on July 7. P learned that D had represented certain clients during 1998 and 1999 without disclosing the representation to the firm, while simultaneously using firm resources and filing pleadings in the firm's name in connection with these matters. D retained all fees derived from these cases for himself. P filed suit against D for breach of fiduciary duty, and D counterclaimed alleging, among other causes of action, breach of oral contract. The district court denied P's motion, for summary judgment and granted D's and the case proceeded to trial. The jury found that $280,000 represented 'the fair and reasonable amount of the fee' owed to D. P appealed the denial of its motion to dismiss.