Oregon v. Newcom

Facts

P received a report that D was abusing and neglecting her dog, Juno. Special Agent Austin Wallace went to D's apartment to investigate.  While the officer was speaking with D inside her apartment, he could see Juno in D's back patio area through the double sliding glass doors. To the officer, who had seen 'hundreds of emaciated animals,' Juno appeared to be in a 'near-emaciated condition,' with 'no fat on his body.' He also noticed that Juno was 'eating at random things in the yard, and * * * trying to vomit.' But Juno was dry heaving and 'nothing was coming up.' D told the Officer she had run out of food and was planning on buying more that evening. The Officer concluded that he had probable cause to believe that D had neglected Juno. D refused to let the Officer take Juno for examination. The Officer took custody of Juno without consent. Dr. Zarah Hedge, a veterinarian, could identify nothing physically wrong with Juno, other than that 'the dog was very thin.' After looking at Juno-whose ribs and vertebrae were visible without having to feel for them-Dr. Hedge gave Juno a body condition score of 1.5. To determine cause she drew a blood sample from Juno for laboratory testing. The laboratory tests revealed nothing medically wrong with Juno that would have caused him to be thin; Dr. Hedge, therefore, concluded that Juno was malnourished and placed him on a special feeding protocol. As a result of that diagnosis, the officer cited defendant for second-degree animal neglect. D moved to suppress the laboratory test results, arguing that the officer lacked probable cause to take Juno into custody, and thus had unlawfully seized the dog. D also argued that Dr. Hedge had engaged in an unreasonable search of defendant's property-i.e., Juno-by drawing and testing Juno's blood without a warrant, in violation of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. D states that since dogs are personal property under Oregon law, they are no different than other items of personal property. D argued that the state could examine only the exterior of seized property without seeking a warrant. P contends that by withdrawing blood from Juno and testing that blood without a warrant, the state intruded into her personal property and revealed information not otherwise open to view, which violated her constitutionally protected privacy. The court denied D’s motion to suppress. The trial court agreed with the prosecutor that a dog is neither a container nor analogous to one, and stated that the closer analogy would be a medical examination and diagnostic analysis of a child taken into protective custody on suspicion of abuse. The jury unanimously returned a guilty verdict on the second-degree animal neglect charge. D appealed. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that Juno's seizure was lawful, but disagreed that Juno's blood could be tested without a warrant. The court concluded that the 'extract[ing] and testing' of Juno's blood, even though Juno was lawfully in the state's custody, was a constitutionally significant intrusion into D's privacy, one that 'exposed otherwise concealed information about the dog that served as evidence of a crime.' P appealed.

Issues

Rule of Law

Holding and Decision

Legal Analysis

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