New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States

212 U.S. 481 (1909)

Facts

The railroad company (D) and Fred L. Pomeroy (D1), its assistant traffic manager, were convicted for the payment of rebates to the American Sugar Refining Company and others upon shipments of sugar from the City of New York to the City of Detroit, Michigan. It was shown that the established, filed, and published rate between New York and Detroit was 23 cents per 100 pounds on sugar, except during the month of June 1904, when it was 21 cents per 100 pounds. By letters between D1, in charge of the traffic of the sugar refining companies and of procuring rates for the shipment of sugar, and the general and assistant traffic managers of the railroad company, it was agreed that Edgar & Son should receive a rate of 18 cents per 100 pounds from New York to Detroit. Shipments were made and claims of rebate made on the basis of a reduction of five cents a hundred pounds from the published rates. These claims were sent to the assistant freight traffic manager of the railroad company by D1, the agent of the sugar companies, and then sent to one Wilson, the general manager of the New York Central and Fast Freight Lines at Buffalo, New York. Wilson returned to the assistant traffic manager of the railroad company a cashier's draft for the amount of the claim. This draft was then sent to the agent of the sugar companies, and his receipt taken. Ds placed all kinds of objections to the evidence. One of which was the validity of the Elkins Act in holding a corporation criminally liable for the acts of any receiver, trustee, lessee, agent, or person acting for or employed by such corporation, would constitute a misdemeanor under said acts, or under this act, shall also be held to be a misdemeanor committed by such corporation; and, upon conviction thereof, it shall be subject to like penalties as are prescribed in said acts, or by this act, with reference to such persons, except as such penalties are herein changed. D contends that Congress has no authority to impute to a corporation the commission of criminal offenses or to subject a corporation to a criminal prosecution by reason of the things charged. D was convicted and appealed.