Ludington & Northern Railway v. The Epworth Assembly

468 N.W.2d 884 (1991)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

The five parcels of land at issue are adjoining fifty-foot-wide strips of land upon which P's railroad track is located. These strips of land pass through the land of D, a Michigan corporation comprised of owners of resort cottages. D desired a railroad to service its members, providing them with transportation to its grounds. Accordingly, in 1895, D conveyed the southernmost strip of the five strips of land to P 'to be used for railroad purposes only.' In 1914, D sought to extend the railroad to some adjoining land to the north. When the extension was accomplished, it was agreed that P would be allowed to transport sand that was mined at the northernmost point of the extension because of the uncertainty of the passenger business in the extended portion. Passenger service decreased and then ceased altogether in 1919 or 1920, and sand was hauled from that time on. The four northern strips were conveyed pursuant to a quitclaim deed containing the following language: If, for any reason the property premises or land above described shall, for one year or longer, cease to be used for railroad purposes, . . . in that case all of the land herein described . . . shall revert to D . . . .The fifth strip of land conveyed 'all the and down to the level of the road bed' in the described premises, and 'also a right-of-way for railroad purposes on and over said land fifty (50) feet wide.' P last operated a train on the track in February 1981. Between 1982 and 1988, D erected a number of barricades across the strips of land, paved over two crossings, planted some trees, placed soil on some of the land, and ran a number of water and sewer pipes under the tracks. P commenced the instant action, seeking money damages, an injunction to prevent D from constructing barricades, and a declaration of the interests of the parties in the five strips of land. D claimed P had abandoned its interests in the strips of land and that the operation of the railroad constituted a nuisance. D brought a motion challenging the constitutionality of 1968 PA 13, MCL 554.61 et seq.; MSA 26.49(11) et seq., which provides for the extinguishment of certain reversionary interests in land. The trial court ruled that the act was constitutional, and further held that §4(c) of the act was not applicable. The trial court found that the title received by P for the four southern strips of land was a fee simple determinable interest, but that D's possibility of reverter in each of the strips had been extinguished pursuant to 1968 PA 13 since D never recorded a written notice indicating its desire to preserve such interests. The court enjoined D from interfering with P's use of the property. It also held that operations of trains over the tracks constituted a de facto nuisance. As for the fifth strip, the court determined that the title received was that of an easement in gross, but that this interest had been terminated by abandonment. Everybody appealed.