Nature of the Case
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Facts
P served as a Maryland state trooper. Because his wife was suffering through a difficult pregnancy and was due to deliver in December 1994, P requested that he be permitted to take leave, starting when the baby was born, pursuant to a new Maryland statutory provision that permitted state employees to use paid sick leave to care for a newborn ('nurturing leave'). The statute defined a 'primary caregiver' as one 'primarily responsible for the care and nurturing of a child.' A 'secondary caregiver,' defined as one who was 'secondarily responsible' for the care of the child, was entitled to only 10 days of accrued sick leave. The statute permitted an employee to use paid sick leave without providing any medical documentation since this type of leave was not actually related to the illness or disability of the employee or the employee's family. P applied for four to eight weeks of 'family sick leave' to attend to his wife, who was confined to bed rest, but he was informed that he would be permitted no more than two weeks. A new 'nurturing leave' provision was enacted. P contacted the administrator in hopes of qualifying for 30 days paid sick leave as a primary caregiver under. P was told that only birth mothers could qualify as primary caregivers. P was allowed 10 days of paid sick leave as a secondary caregiver. P filed an administrative grievance on the basis that he was improperly denied primary caregiver status. P’s grievance was denied at each of the four levels during the administrative grievance procedure. Mrs. Knussman, who was also a Maryland state employee, would be considered the primary caregiver because she took sick leave from December 9, 1994, the delivery date, until January 23, 1995, when she was certified to return to full-time work. But there was evidence that Mrs. Knussman was using the sick leave for her own condition in the wake of a difficult pregnancy. P filed a civil rights action against Maryland, the MSP, and several individual employees of the MSP. P claimed gender discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case proceeded to trial, and, at the close of the evidence, the district court submitted to the jury the question of qualified immunity as well as the ultimate question of liability. The jury determined that each individual defendant denied P's leave request because of D's gender; however, the jury determined that only Mullineaux was not protected by qualified immunity. The jury awarded P $375,000 in damages. Mullineaux appealed. The court concluded that the jury's verdict of $375,000 was excessive in light of the evidence. D appealed. The court vacated the award of damages and remanded for a new damages trial. [On retrial: The court reduced P's award of damages to $40,000 for emotional distress stemming from Mullineaux's actions. P then also filed a petition in district court seeking to recover attorney's fees as the 'prevailing party' in an 'action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section. . . 1983.' 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988(b).]
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