Government Of The Virgin Islands v. Scuit

623 F.2d 869 (1980)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

The victim worked as a waitress where D was a frequent patron. The owner of the restaurant arranged for D to give her a ride to her apartment. It is undisputed that D took a detour down a beach road, where the two had sexual intercourse, after which he took the complainant home. She stated that D turned down the beach road to relieve himself, and then continued to a turnaround, stopped the jeep, and began kissing her. She expressed lack of interest, but D then told her he had a knife and would throw her into the ocean if she did not cooperate. She did not actually see the knife in the dark but felt 'something metal' cut into her neck. She then ceased resistance and attempted to calm him and avoid harm by cooperating. There was medical and other testimony of a cut on the side of her neck where she said the knife was held. D then raped and sodomized her. She prayed and recited her 'mantra.' Upon being dropped off at home, she kissed D on the forehead because, she testified, 'I was praying for him' and 'it was just kind of like an end to the prayer.' D testified that he casually knew her and her sister and had previously driven them home from the restaurant. He said that on the night of July 9, when he gave her a ride to her apartment, she seemed 'a little spaced, not all there.' She offered him marijuana, and he drove off the main road to smoke it with her. He later 'came on to her,' he said. Although initially, she protested, he eventually changed her mind without using or threatening any physical force. In limine and prior to the first trial there had been a discussion between counsel and the court regarding the admissibility of evidence that D previously had raped another young woman after threatening to shoot her with a flare gun. Defense counsel contended that such evidence would be relevant only if the defendant put his character in issue, which he did not at that time intend to do. The prosecutor agreed not to mention the other alleged rape in the opening statement to the jury, but reserved the right to seek admission of the evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) if the testimony that was adduced created the opportunity. The trial judge asserted that the evidence could be admissible only if he became satisfied that it was relevant and met the Fed.R.Evid. 403 standard of probative value outweighing prejudice to the defendant. When the evidence of a flare gun was introduced at the first trial, the trial judge granted a mistrial. In motions preceding the second trial, D asked that the indictment be dismissed on double jeopardy grounds, or, if it were not, for an order requiring a psychiatric examination of the complainant 'and further providing that the results of (the) examination be made available to the defense for possible use at trial.' Both motions were denied and, after a trial with essentially the same evidence as in the first, but without the prejudicial incidents noted by the judge, D was convicted.