On February 22, 1994, D entered into a contract with Dashiell (P) for construction of the proposed renovation. The price was $3,075,383.00 to furnish all labor, equipment, materials, and services, and perform all of the work necessary to renovate and expand a detention center by a date no later than 425 calendar days after the date of commencement. The contract provided that liquidated damages of $500 per calendar day would be assessed if P failed to complete the project within the 425 calendar-day period. The contract allowed for the incorporation of additional documents intended to form part of the contract documents. The parties agreed to include American Institute of Architects, General Conditions of the Contract for Construction, Document A201 (1987), which contains the provisions of the contract that are the subject of this appeal. On March 22, 1994, P received a Notice to Proceed. P began to encounter construction delays for which it requested an extension. A sixty-day extension of time was granted. The new completion date was July 21, 1995. No further completion date extensions were granted. Ultimately, construction of the project was not completed by the required date of July 21, 1995. By letter dated July 15, 1996, P submitted a claim in accordance with section 4.3 of the General Conditions of the Contract for Construction. P sought a change order extending the contract completion date by 522 days and increasing the contract price by $1,061,038.00 for delays incurred up to and including June 20, 1996, allegedly due to architectural and engineer design deficiencies, weather delays, and concealed or unknown conditions. Furthermore, in a letter dated December 16, 1996, respondent made another claim for additional time and financial compensation resulting from delays, which were incurred after June 20, 1996. The County has occupied the renovated detention center since June 6, 1996. P brought suit basing its claims on quasi-contract and unjust enrichment against D. The court held that summary judgment for D on the quasi-contract and unjust enrichment claims was proper, as quasi-contract and unjust enrichment did not apply when there was an express written contract. P appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision to grant summary judgment on P's quasi-contractual claim for unjust enrichment. D appealed.