P decided that she wanted to undergo gastric bypass surgery. P knew that D performed this type of surgery because he had performed the procedure on her partner's mother, with very good results. P researched the matter and determined that D was considered to be the best gastric bypass surgeon in the state. P was required to attend a seminar that D conducted at Middlesex (D). In addition, she attended a number of informational sessions at Middlesex that were conducted by D's staff. P received a pamphlet at one of the informational sessions that had been prepared by Middlesex, and that stated that 'the health care team who will be caring for you has developed an education program that is full of important information.' It stated that 'the team will go over every aspect of your stay with us. We will discuss what you should do at home before your operation, what to bring with you, and events on the day of surgery.' P assumed that D was an employee of Middlesex because he had privileges there, and she relied on this belief when she chose to undergo surgery at Middlesex. D performed the surgery. P was then diagnosed with breast cancer and underwent a computerized tomography (CT) scan of her chest, abdomen, and pelvis. The CT scan revealed the presence of foreign material in the plaintiff's abdominal cavity. P met with D, who informed her that the object in her abdominal cavity was a surgical sponge. P sued D for negligence and claimed that Middlesex was vicariously liable for D's negligence because it had held D out as its agent or employee. Middlesex filed a motion for summary judgment in that the doctrine of apparent authority was not recognized as a basis for tort liability in the state as a matter of law. The trial court concluded that the doctrine of apparent agency had not been recognized in this state. It held that P's claim of vicarious liability against Middlesex was barred as a matter of law and it rendered summary judgment for Middlesex on that claim. P appealed from an affirmation by the Appellate Court.