D was convicted of, and sentenced to death for, the murder of an elderly couple in Memphis, Tennessee. The killings culminated a 2-day crime rampage that began when D robbed a Memphis jewelry store of $112,000 in merchandise, went on a high-speed chase, shot an officer who tried to apprehend him, shot a citizen who confronted him, and, at gunpoint, demanded that another hand over his car keys. As a police helicopter hovered overhead, respondent tried to shoot the fleeing car owner but was frustrated because his gun was out of ammunition. D managed to elude detection as police combed the surrounding area. Officers inventorying his car found an array of illegal and prescription drugs, the stolen merchandise, and more than $2,400 in cash. D reappeared early Sunday morning when he drew a gun on an elderly resident who refused to let him in to use her telephone. Later that afternoon, D broke into the home of Shipley and Cleopatra Todd, aged 93 and 79 years old, and killed them by repeatedly beating them about the head with a blunt instrument. He moved their bodies so that they would not be visible from the front and rear doors and ransacked the first floor of their home. After shaving his beard, D traveled to Florida. He was arrested there for robbing a drugstore in Pompano Beach. He admitted killing the Todds and shooting the police officer. At trial, the prosecution adduced overwhelming physical and testimonial evidence showing that D perpetrated the crimes and that he killed the Todds in a brutal and callous fashion. D sought to prove that he was not guilty by reason of insanity. D suffered from substance abuse and posttraumatic stress disorders related to his military service in Vietnam. Drug-caused chronic amphetamine psychosis, hallucinations, and ongoing paranoia, which affected D's mental capacity and ability to obey the law. D was convicted, and a sentencing hearing was conducted the next day. Under Tennessee law, a death sentence was required if the jury found unanimously that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance that was not outweighed by any mitigating circumstance. The State said it would prove four aggravating factors: that (1) respondent had previously been convicted of one or more felonies involving the use or threat of violence to a person; (2) he knowingly created a great risk of death to two or more persons other than the victim during the act of murder; (3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (4) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding unlawful arrest. In his opening statement, defense counsel called the jury's attention to the mitigating evidence already before them. He suggested that D was under the influence of extreme mental disturbance or duress, that he was an addict whose drug and other problems stemmed from the stress of his military service, and that he felt remorse. Counsel urged the jury that there was a good reason for preserving his client's life if one looked at 'the whole man.' He asked for mercy, calling it a blessing that would raise them above the State to the level of God. The prosecution then called a records custodian and fingerprint examiner to establish that respondent had three armed robbery convictions and two officers who said they tried unsuccessfully to arrest respondent for armed robbery after the jewelry store heist. Through cross-examination of the records custodian, respondent's attorney brought out that his client had been awarded the Bronze Star in Vietnam. After defense counsel successfully objected to the State's proffer of photos of the Todds' decomposing bodies, both sides rested. The junior prosecuting attorney on the case gave what the state courts described as a 'low-key' closing. Defense counsel waived final argument, preventing the lead prosecutor, who by all accounts was an extremely effective advocate, from arguing in rebuttal. The jury found in both murder cases four aggravating factors and no mitigating circumstances substantial enough to outweigh them. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed respondent's convictions and sentence on appeal. D petitioned for state post-conviction relief, contending that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the sentencing phase by failing to present mitigating evidence and by waiving final argument. The Tennessee Criminal Court rejected this contention. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The Tennessee Supreme Court denied respondent permission to appeal. In 1997, D sought a federal writ of habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. §2254. The District Court ruled that respondent did not meet §2254(d)'s requirements and denied the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the refusal to issue a writ with respect to respondent's conviction but reversed with respect to his sentence. It held that respondent suffered a Sixth Amendment violation for which prejudice should be presumed under United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S. 648 (1984), because his counsel, by not asking for mercy after the prosecutor's final argument, did not subject the State's call for the death penalty to meaningful adversarial testing. The state court's adjudication of respondent's Sixth Amendment claim, in the Court of Appeals' analysis, was, therefore, an unreasonable application of the clearly established law announced in Strickland.